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I. INTRODUCTION 1
Virtually every law enforcement agency in the United States
has accepted the view that "going after the money" is the most
effective way to catch and hurt organized crime. Numerous ratio-
nales underlie this now common wisdom. The most basic of these
is that insofar as criminals, and particularly organized criminals,
act as they do for the money, the best deterrent and punishment is
to confiscate their incentive. A second rationale is that, while the
higher-level and more powerful criminals rarely come into contact
with the illicit goods, such as drugs, from which they derive their
profits, they do come into contact with the proceeds from the sale
of those goods. That contact often provides a "paper trail," or
other evidence, which constitutes the only connection with a viola-
tion of the law. A third rationale is that confiscating the proceeds
of criminal activities is a good way to make law enforcement pay
for itself.
The significance of connecting a criminal with the proceeds of
his illicit activities is thus twofold: it establishes a violation of the
law for which he can be prosecuted and imprisoned; and it identi-
fies his assets so that they can be forfeited to the government. The
criminal's challenge is to "launder" his "dirty money" so that it
appears clean and is thereby useful to him. The law enforcer's
challenge is to "unlaunder" that money and thereby expose its
connection with a criminal activity.
Much has been written during the last few years about the
techniques used to launder money and the variety of institutions
that engage in such chicanery. A prominent aspect of the money
1. In preparing this paper, the author benefitted from interviews conducted between
October 1984 and April 1985 with fifty individuals. These included officials in the Depart-
ments of State, Justice and the Treasury, the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
the IRS, U.S. Customs, the U.S. National Central Bureau of INTERPOL, and Congress. A
few interviews were also conducted with foreign government officials, bankers and private
attorneys with extensive knowledge in this area. All of the interviews were on a not-for-
attribution basis. The author wishes to express his gratitude for their cooperation, in partic-
ular to those who offered comments on earlier drafts of this article.
The initial draft of this article was a report for the Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics Matters. This article constitutes a revised and updated version of
that report. In preparing the report, the author had access to classified materials, although
the report itself relied entirely on unclassified materials. At the request of officials in the
State Department's Legal Adviser's Office, approximately six or seven sentences contained
in the initial report were omitted from subsequent drafts. None of these concerned substan-
tive issues discussed in this article. Some were subsequently replaced when public sources of
the same information became available.
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laundering business has been the use of offshore financial secrecy
jurisdictions (FSJ's) to obscure the "paper trail" upon which law
enforcement agents rely to unlaunder dirty money. This article de-
scribes what has been done, and by whom, to make that paper trail
more visible. It also sets the questions of international laundering
of drug money, and of government efforts to control it, in their
broader context. The essence of that context is the desire of all
FSJ's to preserve, at a very minimum, their status as secure havens
for the billions of dollars which are not derived from drug traffick-
ing and other criminal activities.
II. THE BANK SECRECY ACT AND U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES
One of the basic operating assumptions in this area is that
cash-or its equivalent in negotiable instruments of one sort or an-
other-is the standard medium of exchange in illicit transactions
such as drug sales. Disposing of this cash is typically the first step
in the laundering process. In order to make this disposal more dif-
ficult, Congress passed the Bank Secrecy Act in 1970.2 This legisla-
tion imposed two requirements which have become of primary im-
portance in financial investigations.3 The first requires banks (and
most other financial institutions) to submit Currency Transaction
Reports (known as CTR's or 4789's) to the IRS for any transaction
involving more than $10,000 in cash (or other bearer negotiable in-
struments). The second requires individuals to submit Currency
and Monetary Instruments Reports (known as CMIR's or 4790's)
to U.S. Customs whenever transporting more than $5,000 across
the border.4
The purposes of this legislation were twofold: to provide a
2. The Bank Records and Foreign Transaction Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, was signed into
law on October 26, 1970 by President Nixon. Title I of that Act, which is codified in sections
1951-1959 of title 12 of the United States Code, requires banks and most other financial
institutions to retain certain financial records for up to five years. Title II of the Act, which
is presently codified at sections 5311-5323 of title 31 of the Code, was entitled the "Currency
and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act." Its requirements are discussed in the above text.
3. A third requirement is that any person with a foreign financial account must disclose
that fact on his income tax form and fill out a Foreign Bank Account Report (FBAR). Al-
though there have been successful prosecutions for failure to comply with this law, this form
has not proved as useful as the other two in identifying money laundering operations. One
reason is that the notice of the disclosure requirement on the income tax form has not been
consistent from year to year.
4. The amount was recently raised to $10,000.
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source of information on people, corporations, and banks engaged
in large-scale cash transactions, and to create criminal penalties
and forfeiture provisions for non-compliance. Since 1982, the infor-
mation collected has been compiled into a computerized data base
known as the Treasury Enforcement Communications System
(TECS), which is supervised by the Treasury Financial Law En-
forcement Center (TFLEC). Theoretically, the effect of the Bank
Secrecy Act was to oblige criminals to either report their financial
transactions or violate a criminal statute.
Enforcement of the Bank Secrecy Act, and drug-related finan-
cial investigations in general, proceeded at a very slow pace
throughout the 1970's. A combination of legal challenges and a va-
riety of bureaucratic lags accounted for this.5 The legal challenges
involved not only the constitutionality of the Act but also disputes
regarding the definitions of "financial institutions" and "monetary
instruments," levels of proof, attempts to evade the law, timing of
filing, who was required to file, and so on. The reasons for bureau-
cratic lag were even more diverse. Confusion and disagreement
over many of the issues addressed by the courts were partially re-
sponsible. So too were the customary bureaucratic tensions and
turf struggles. But most significant were the uncertainties concern-
ing how the Act should be implemented, what should be done with
the information collected, and how that information should be dis-
tributed. Finally, the ignorance and indifference of financial insti-
tutions to the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, caused in
part by the government's failure to publicize them, contributed
substantially to the failure in fulfilling the potential of the Act.'
Not until the very end of the 1970's did the Act begin to re-
ceive greater attention; but even then, law enforcement efforts
lagged substantially behind the rhetoric stressing the importance
of financial investigations to prosecuting drug trafficking organiza-
tions. The growing concern was generated in part by the dramatic
increase in cocaine use, and in the proceeds derived from traffick-
ing. The proliferation of offshore FSJ's, and increasing indications
5. The principal legal case was California Bankers Assoc. v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974),
in which the Supreme Court held that the recordkeeping requirements of the Bank Secrecy
Act were constitutional. NARCOTIC AND DANGEROUS DRUG SECTION, CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF ILLEGAL MONEY LAUNDERING
(1983)(case law and guide relating to the Bank Secrecy Act).
6. See U.S. Failing to Catch Dirty Cash, Boston Globe, September 25, 1985, at 1
(fourth in an excellent seven-part series on money laundering which appeared in the Boston
newspaper the week of September 22-28, 1985).
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that criminals were taking advantage of their services, also contrib-
uted to the heightened interest in implementing the Bank Secrecy
Act more effectively. These developments led to greater attentions
by the General Accounting Office, Congressional committees, and
internal agency auditors, all of which pointed out inadequacies in
the law enforcement effort as well as problems with the Act itself.7
In 1984, the President's Commission on Organized Crime
picked this issue as its first subject of inquiry.8 Its report, entitled
The Cash Connection, discussed the various problems which had
been encountered in the enforcement of the Bank Secrecy Act, and
proposed a "Financial Institutions Protection Act" to rectify
them.' Many of its suggestions, such as increased penalties, re-
wards for information, including currency violations as a basis for
RICO prosecutions, and clarifying certain inconsistencies in the
case law, had already been included as Title IX of the Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act enacted that year.'" Many of the remaining
proposals, including one which specifically makes money launder-
ing a federal (Title 18) crime, were debated throughout the course
of the 99th Congress by a variety of congressional committees."
7. See GAO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS. BANK SECRECY ACT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
HAVE NOT YET MET EXPECTATIONS, SUGGESTING NEED FOR AMENDMENT (1981). The most
significant of the Congressional hearings was conducted by the Senate's Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigations. See Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Crime
and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies: Hearings Before the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983)[hereinafter Crime and Secrecy, Hearings]. For even more important sources
of information see the PERM. SURCOMM. ON INVESTIGATION'S INITIAL STAFF STUDY, CRIME AND
SECRECY: THE USE OF OFFSHORE BANKS AND COMPANIES, S. Rep. No. 21, 98th Cong. (Febru-
ary 1983) [hereinafter CRIME AND SECRECY, STAFF STUDY] and PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGA-
TION'S FINAL REPORT, CRIME AND SECRECY: THE USE OF OFFSHORE BANKS AND COMPANIES, S.
Rep. No. 130, 99th Cong. (1985). The Staff Study was later expanded and published by a
consultant to the subcommittee. See R. BLUM, OFFSHORE HAVEN BANKS, TRUSTS, AND COMPA-
NIES: THE BUSINESS OF CRIME IN THE EUROMARKET (1984) (perhaps the best study in this
area). The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation's hearings had been preceded since
the mid-1970's by about two dozen other hearings held by other committees on money laun-
dering, the Bank Secrecy Act, offshore havens, tax evasion and similar topics. A listing of
these hearings can be found in Weiland, Congress and the Transnational Crime Problem,
20 INT'L LAW. 1025, 1029-30 (1986).
8. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, ORGANIZED CRIME AND MONEY
LAUNDERING (1984)(Record of Hearing II, March 14, 1984). The first hearing did not focus
on any specific theme, its purpose being to set the context for future hearings.
9. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL IN-
STITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING (1984) [hereinafter THE CASH CONNECTION].
10. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT
OF 1984 (1984).
11. For an excellent overview of recent Congressional efforts with respect to money
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Despite broad support for cracking down on the financial dimen-
sions of drug trafficking, opposition to the broad sweep of the pro-
posed statutes was heard from many factions. 2 Lawyers argued
that the proposed legislation would greatly curtail their ability to
represent criminal defendants and would infringe on the attorney-
client privilege. Bankers resisted the proliferation of regulations
with which they would have to comply. Foreign governments were
angered by the explicitly extraterritorial applications of the pro-
posed legislation. On October 17, 1986, the House and Senate
reached agreement on the anti-drug bill and sent it to the White
House for the President's signature. The legislation's provisions re-
garding money laundering reportedly extend the powers of law en-
forcement authorities in investigating violations of the Bank Se-
crecy Act and other money laundering crimes. No doubt many of
laundering and other transnational crime, see the article by the former chief counsel to the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Weiland, supra note 7. The Congressional
hearings on money laundering included:
Tax Evasion Through Use of False Foreign Addresses: Hearing Before the Commerce,
Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Opera-
tions, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984);
Use of Casinos to Launder Proceeds of Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984);
Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act: Hearing on Title IX of S. 1762
Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984);
Money Laundering Operations and the Role of the Department of the Treasury: Hear-
ing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985);
Domestic Money Laundering: The First National Bank of Boston: Hearing Before the
Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)[hereinafter Hearing: Domestic Money Laundering: The First Na-
tional Bank of Boston];
Drug Money Laundering: Hearing on S. 571 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing & Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985);
Money Laundering in Puerto Rico: Hearing Before the Perm. Subcomm. on Investiga-
tions of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985);
Money Laundering Legislation: Hearing on S. 572, S. 1335, and S. 1385 of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., lst Sess. (1985);
The Drug Money Seizure Act and the Bank Secrecy Act Amendments: Hearing on S.
571 and S. 2306 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)[hereinafter Hearings: The Drug Money Seizure Act and the Bank
Secrecy Act Amendments];
Tax Evasion, Drug Trafficking, and Money Laundering as They Involve Financial In-
stitutions: Hearings on H.R. 1367, H.R. 1474, H.R. 1945, H.R. 2785, H.R. 3892, H.R. 4280,
and H.R. 4573 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and
Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1986).
12. See, e.g., Pasztor, House Panel Backs Broader Definition, Tougher Penalties for
Money Laundering, Wall St. J., July 30, 1986, at 48, col. 1.
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those provisions will be subjected to legal challenges during the
next few years.
As Congress has begun to iron out the wrinkles and fill in the
loopholes in the Bank Secrecy Act, so have the law enforcement
agencies made progress in identifying and prosecuting money laun-
dering operations. The Treasury Department, including the Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, Customs and the IRS,
have, by law, assumed the lead in investigating violations of the
Bank Secrecy Act (Title 31). In the case of IRS, these investiga-
tions frequently have gone hand in hand with tax evasion (Title
26) investigations. Justice Department agencies also have been in-
creasingly active in this area. The DEA, pursuant to its Title 21
authority to investigate narcotics violations, has become involved
wherever a money laundering operation has been linked to drug
trafficking."3 The FBI has increasingly become involved in investi-
gating money laundering activities linked to racketeering and other
Title 18 federal crimes. 4 Finally, the U.S. Attorney's Offices, and
sections of the Justice Department's Criminal Division-including
the Office of International Affairs, the Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs Section, and the Assets and Forfeiture Section-have coor-
dinated the investigations and prosecutions.8
Over the past few years, enforcement of the Bank Secrecy Act
has improved dramatically. The table below lists the total number
of CTR's filed annually between 1979 and 1985.10 (In 1975, it is
worth noting, only 3,418 CTR's were filed.) The dramatic jump in
the last year can be explained in good part by the reaction of
banks to the well publicized prosecution of the Bank of Boston in
early 1985 for its failure to file a large number of CTR's. In Janu-
ary, 1986, 271,630 CTR's were filed, more than in all of 1980.
13. See Mangan, Investigating the Laundering of International Drug Money, 10 DRUG
ENFORCEMENT, Fall 1983, at 12-16.
14. Among its first endeavors in this area was Operation Bancoshares, a two-and-a-half
year undercover investigation in which agents laundered money to gather information on
the financial side of drug trafficking. See, e.g., Jaynes, F.B.I. Traces Flow of Drug Financ-
ing, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1981, at Al, col. 1.
15. The role which other agencies, such as the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal
Reserve Board, the FDIC, the SEC and others, play in supervising compliance with the
Bank Secrecy Act is not discussed in this paper. See THE CASH CONNECTiON, supra note 9,
at 17-27; see also Hearing: Domestic Money Laundering: The First National Bank of Bos-
ton, supra note 11.
16. The source of the table is Hearings: Drug Money Seizure Act and the Bank Se-
crecy Act Amendments, supra note 11, at 33-36.
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TOTAL CURRENCY TRANSACTION REPORTS RECEIVED BY
THE IRS
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
121,000 241,850 352,112 405,213 513,782 707,246 1,832,000
TFLEC, established by the Treasury Department in January
1982, has presumably become increasingly adept at manipulating
the information derived from these forms to identify people and
organizations involved in money laundering. The other agencies
also have increased their levels of expertise in this area. Most nota-
bly, the IRS, with its long experience in investigating financial chi-
canery, has increased the proportion of its Criminal Investigative
Division (CID) agents dedicated to narcotics-related prosecutions
from six to eight percent in 1980 to roughly twenty-five percent of
its 2800 agents in 1985.17 In the non-drug area, the IRS has devel-
oped its investigation of offshore tax evaders in Operation DOME,
an acronym for Domestic-Offshore Monetary Exchange."8 The tax
agency also has established a small intelligence unit, known as the
Tax Haven Project, to improve its analysis of money laundering
operations. One of the techniques developed by this unit has been
the computerized cross-tabulation of TECS information with data
provided by other regulatory and law enforcement agencies.
Perhaps the most successful law enforcement approach to Ti-
tle 31 financial investigations has been the multi-agency task force,
best epitomized by Operation Greenback in Miami. 9 Coordinated
by a federal prosecutor and operating under the control of a fed-
eral grand jury, with the power to issue subpoenas and call wit-
nesses to testify, its information-gathering power has been sub-
stantial. So too, many of the bureaucratic and legal restrictions
that inhibit the sharing of expertise, information and informants
among agents from traditionally competitive agencies have been
alleviated.2 0
Despite the improvements in law enforcement operations,
17. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX HAVENS IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN (1984).
18. See Ricks, Tax Evaders Find Foreign Banks Aren't Havens of Secrecy Anymore,
Wall St. J., Aug. 14, 1985, at 25, col. 4.
19. See Blau, Role of the Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section in the Federal Gov-
ernment's Fight Against Drug Trafficking, 11 DRUG ENFORCEMENT 1, 16-19 (1984)(brief
description of Operation Greenback's activities).
20. For instance, the strictures of 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1954), which substantially limit the
IRS's power to share tax return information with other agencies, do not apply to informa-
tion obtained pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act.
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however, it would be inaccurate to assert that the money launder-
ing problem is virtually solved, or that focusing on money launder-
ing represents any sort of panacea in the fight against organized
crime and drug trafficking. Most illicitly derived money continues
to be successfully laundered. Indeed, we still remain largely igno-
rant of the overall scope of the problem and challenge.2' Although
most of this article focuses on the international aspects of money
laundering, it is important to realize that most dirty money, in-
cluding most drug money, is almost certainly laundered without
ever leaving the United States. Experts estimate that the size of
the underground American economy is $60 billion to $600 billion a
year, a range which suggests that not only is a tremendous amount
of money laundered in this country, but also that law enforcement
agencies are unable to determine what portion of the money is tied
to the underground economy." Stated more specifically, it is per-
haps impossible to tell whether the rate of compliance with the
Bank Secrecy Act's CTR and CMIR requirements is ten percent or
fifty percent.
Most law enforcement agents involved in this area agree that
the more sophisticated criminal organizations are able to keep at
least a step ahead of the government's efforts. The techniques
available for laundering even substantial amounts of dirty money
are virtually limitless. Law enforcement agencies, with their rela-
tively limited resources, are constantly discovering new methods.
Countering them often necessitates extensive additional resources
and onerous regulations.
The challenges in this area are even greater and more compli-
cated in the international financial arena. U.S. law enforcement
agents are at a severe disadvantage in collecting information and
evidence of American crimes from abroad. The greatest obstacles
are posed by the financial secrecy laws of a host of foreign states.
Only in the last few years has the United States made strides in
penetrating these laws. Ten years ago law enforcement agents were
virtually helpless when a paper trail of dirty money led abroad.
Today, options occasionally exist to follow that trail.
21. An analysis by the intelligence community estimated that "some $5-15 billion of the
$50-75 billion in illegal drug money earned in the United States probably moves into inter-
national financial channels each year." See THE CASH CONNECTION, Supra note 9, at 13.
22. The "underground economy" is typically defined as including both illegally earned
money and legally earned money on which taxes have been evaded. See the discussion of
this issue in R. BLUM, supra note 7, at 55-60.
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In assessing what has been done and what can be done in the
area of combatting international money laundering, it is important
to recognize two other, intricately related issues. The first is the
use of offshore tax havens to reduce, avoid, and evade American
taxes on both legally and illegally derived revenue. The second is
the use of those same havens by citizens of other countries not
only to escape paying taxes, but also to circumvent currency con-
trol regulations. Both of these issues will be discussed in greater
depth below.
III. INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING: THE NEED FOR FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE
American law enforcement agencies essentially want three
things: information, evidence, and the body-that is, the crimi-
nal.23 The types of information or intelligence desired can be sepa-
rated into three categories: strategic, tactical, and operational.24
Strategic intelligence involves the big picture: which countries are
being used to launder money, how much money is being laundered,
what is the final destination of much of the money, and so on. Tac-
tical intelligence involves the more specific information necessary
to target and develop investigations: identities of traffickers, their
financial advisors, and banks involved in laundering money, and
the techniques and routes utilized by them. Finally, operational in-
telligence involves the detailed information needed to make cases.
This includes both the information necessary to identify and follow
a paper trail, such as bank account numbers and the identities of
the beneficiaries or principals of secret trusts or bank accounts, as
well as the short notice time, place and identity tips which allow
law enforcement agents to arrest either fugitives or persons en-
gaged in a crime at the time of arrest (such as for attempting to
take more than $10,000 in or out of the United States without fil-
ing a CMIR).
The sources of this information vary. Much of it is acquired
domestically from government forms such as the CTR's and
CMIR's, from data bases such as TFLEC which analyze these
23. Kenney, Structures and Methods of International and Regional Cooperation in
Penal Matters, 29 N.YL. ScH. L. REV. 39 (1984)(overview of the legal aspects to interna-
tional cooperation against crime).
24. The categorization is somewhat crudely modeled after that used by the DEA Office
of Intelligence.
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forms, and in the course of law enforcement investigations. When
information must be acquired from abroad, the sources are simi-
larly varied, ranging from the foreign governments themselves to
law enforcement agencies, banks and informants. The willingness
of foreign governments to cooperate depends on a number of fac-
tors: their overall relationship with the United States, their suscep-
tibility to American pressure, their concern for reputation, their
attitude toward financial and other criminal activities, the power
and influence of their financial sector, and their perception of how
cooperating with American financial investigations will affect their
economic well-being. Foreign governments are not, however, uni-
tary actors. At times, one sector of the government, perhaps a spe-
cific ministry or regulatory agency, will extend cooperation to
American investigators without other sectors of the government
being fully apprised of their actions.
Cooperation from foreign law enforcement agencies and agents
is thus only partially dependent on their governments' stated posi-
tions. Some will merely reflect their governments' positive or nega-
tive policies in this area. Some will feel bound to uphold their
countries' secrecy laws. Some will have been corrupted by the
criminal elements (and will often reflect corruption in high levels
of the government). On the other hand, many foreign law enforce-
ment agents are willing to extend cooperation far beyond that de-
sired or even realized by their governments. Their motivations no
doubt vary, ranging from a sense of professionalism and police
comradeship which transcends national borders, to a sense of re-
sentment at the illicitly derived wealth of the financial elite, to the
personal relationships which develop between them and their
American counterparts.
The willingness of banks to cooperate with financial investiga-
tions is sporadic at best. In the United States, efforts to encourage
banks to report suspicious transactions to law enforcement and
regulatory agencies have met with substantial resistance and indif-
ference. More often than not, their cooperation has been compelled
by either subpoenas or threats of prosecution. The anti-drug bill
passed by Congress in mid-October 1986 includes a number of in-
centives for banks to cooperate more willingly in money laundering
investigations. One provision makes the act of money laundering
itself illegal, thereby greatly increasing the criminal liability of
bank officials who know or have reason to know that they are han-
dling dirty money for their customers. Another amends the Right
1986]
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to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 by expanding the ability of finan-
cial institutions to voluntarily cooperate with law enforcement
agencies. Other provisions expand the Title 31 reporting require-
ments to include a host of financial instruments and transactions
not yet covered.
In the absence of cooperation from foreign governments, the
United States has few tools at its disposal in attempting to extract
information from offshore banks. Over the past few years, prosecu-
tors have utilized subpoenas with increasing frequency to obtain
information from abroad. This tactic, which has generated sub-
stantial resentment and anger around the world-not only in the
Caribbean but also in England, Canada, Switzerland, West Ger-
many, and other leading members of the global financial sys-
tem-is discussed below.
A second method relied upon by U.S. law enforcers in the ab-
sence of foreign government cooperation is the use of informants.
The information which these individuals provide frequently has
proven crucial in acquiring both tactical and operational intelli-
gence. Sometimes the information is provided by foreign law en-
forcement officials against the wishes of their superiors-who may
be either corrupt or strict enforcers of the nation's secrecy laws. Or
it may be provided by airport officials and employees who become
aware of movements of currency into or out of the country. Or it
may come from bank employees, ranging from tellers to high-level
officers, who provide information on bank account numbers, depos-
its, transfers, customers and so on. Whatever their motivations,
whether it be money,2 5 friendship, a promise of immunity, a sense
of honesty, or a desire to cause harm to someone else, the cultiva-
tion of these informants is heavily dependent upon the skills and
resources of U.S. law enforcement agents abroad. The principal ob-
stacle they face is the opposition of the host governments. Even
those that are willing to allow DEA agents substantial latitude in
narcotics investigations are rarely willing to extend the same lati-
tude to financial investigations, which often necessitate breaches of
their secrecy laws.
In part because of foreign government resistance, relatively
25. One of the recent amendments to the Bank Secrecy Act enacted in 1984 is 31
U.S.C. § 5323 (Supp. II 1984), which provides for rewards of up to $150,000 for information
on title 31 violations which lead to criminal fines, civil penalties, or forfeitures. Insofar as
there are no restrictions on this money being paid to foreign informants, this provision has
the potential to substantially increase the incentives to foreigners to provide information.
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few U.S. law enforcement agents are assigned to foreign informa-
tion collection in this area. The DEA has more agents stationed
overseas than all other U.S. law enforcement agencies combined.
Although many of its 205 agents (and fifteen intelligence analysts)
abroad do devote some time and resources to collecting financial
intelligence, it is not a priority-except in Switzerland. The rea-
sons probably include the historical agency disposition toward go-
ing after the drugs instead of the money, as well as their lack of
statutory authority to investigate Title 31 violations. The Customs
presence overseas is limited to less than a dozen countries, and
their principal priority appears to be high technology smuggling.
Only in Panama is money laundering even a secondary priority.
IRS's presence overseas includes only thirty-one Revenue Service
representatives in fifteen countries, only two of whom have Crimi-
nal Investigation Branch (CID) backgrounds. Its principal efforts
in this area are apparently focused on the Caribbean and Mexico.
The FBI, with roughly the same size presence overseas as the IRS,
is far less operationally oriented than the DEA. With the exception
of Canada, Italy and Switzerland, where the FBI has become in-
volved in investigating narcotic cases and related financial flows,
its participation is quite limited. All of these agencies occasionally
supplement their overseas offices by sending additional agents
from headquarters or other domestic offices to gather intelligence,
to investigate international aspects of domestic cases, or to under-
take undercover operations. The extensive limitations imposed by
American, foreign and international law, by sensitivities of national
sovereignty, and by an assortment of logistical and bureaucratic
difficulties, however, oblige the United States to rely primarily on
foreign law enforcement agencies for information collection abroad.
A substantial limitation with information obtained from both
domestic and foreign informants is that it frequently is not usable
in court. There are two basic reasons for this. The first is that dis-
closing the information obtained in court often requires "burning
the informant," that is, disclosing his identity. This both destroys
the informant's potential as a source of intelligence for future cases
and places his life in jeopardy. The second is that the information,
particularly that obtained from abroad, often fails to meet the evi-
dentiary requirements of American law, which require documents
to be certified and authenticated. Although the United States has
taken steps in recent years to ease the admissibility of information
collected abroad, there are only limited ways of circumventing the
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former problem.2 6
IV. LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR OBTAINING INFORMATION FROM
ABROAD
In addition to undertaking law enforcement operations and
recruiting informants abroad, the United States utilizes an assort-
ment of legal mechanisms to collect both intelligence and admissi-
ble evidence from abroad. The most successful of these, and the
one which is widely considered the wave of the future, has been the
negotiation of legal assistance treaties and exchange-of-informa-
tion agreements with foreign governments.2 7 Some of these treaties
and agreements provide for general assistance in criminal matters,
others for assistance only in narcotics cases, and others for assis-
tance in tax matters. All of these treaties, including the tax agree-
ments, have proven valuable in prosecuting drug traffickers on an
array of federal charges. There has been a considerable accelera-
tion in the negotiation of all these treaties in the last few years.
Negotiations on the first mutual legal assistance treaty
(MLAT) began over fifteen years ago in response to increasing evi-
dence that Swiss banks were being used to launder and hide organ-
ized crime money. The need for such a treaty reflected continuing
frustration over obstacles to international cooperation in criminal
legal matters. Although Swiss judicial authorities possessed the
power to penetrate their country's secrecy laws, the law limited
their authority to use those same powers on behalf of requests
from foreign authorities. Requests for assistance by letters roga-
tory, which required justice ministries to communicate through
their respective foreign ministries, tended to prove time-consuming
and exasperating. The absence of any agency in the foreign coun-
try with a sufficient interest or incentive to act willingly on behalf
of American requests also hindered cooperation. Even when infor-
mation was forthcoming, it frequently was not provided in a form
admissible in American courts. Lastly, differences in both substan-
tive criminal law and criminal procedure greatly complicated the
26. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 included a few provisions to im-
prove the admissibility of foreign evidence in American courts. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3505, 3507
(1982). See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTIcE, HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT
OF 1984, supra note 10, ch. XII, pt. K, at 176-77.
27. See Nadelmann, Negotiations in Criminal Law Assistance Treaties, 33 Am. J.
CoMP. L. 467 (1985)(thorough discussion of the negotiation of mutual legal assistance
treaties).
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process of deciphering and complying with requests from abroad.
After years of negotiation, a U.S.-Swiss MLAT went into effect in
1977.8 Eight years later, over 300 requests from the United States
had been handled by Swiss authorities, and a smaller number of
Swiss requests by the Americans.
Although the treaty resolved many of the problems noted
above, it has proven to be something less than a panacea. An ex-
tensive right of appeal available to those affected by American re-
quests has contributed to substantial delay in Swiss compliance
with American requests.29 The Swiss refusal to permit information
provided by them to be used in tax evasion prosecutions has cre-
ated limitations and tensions.3" Variations in cantonal law (compa-
rable to some extent to variations in state law in the United
States) have led to no small amount of confusion." Despite these
and other problems, however, U.S.-Swiss cooperation in law en-
forcement matters has generally been excellent, with both sides
able to work out their respective complaints. The Swiss Federal
Assembly's passage of a Federal Act on International Mutual As-
sistance in Criminal Matters (IMAC) in early 1981, which codified
and expanded many of the treaty's provisions, has also benefitted
the United States and other countries. 32 Of all the FSJ's, the Swiss
28. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-
Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (entered into force Jan. 23, 1977). The text of
the treaty and a section- by-section analysis are provided in TREATY WITH THE SWISS CONFED-
ERATION ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, Senate Exec Doc. F, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976).
29. Indeed, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 included three provisions
specifically intended to address this problem. The first is a new section, 18 U.S.C. § 3506
(Supp. 1984), which requires a national or resident of the United States who files a formal
opposition in a foreign court to an official U.S. request for evidence to serve a copy of that
pleading on the United States. The second new provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3292 (Supp. 1] 1984),
permits a court to suspend the running of the statute of limitations in cases in which the
indictment has been delayed by the need to obtain foreign evidence. The third provision is
an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (1982) which allows exclusions from the running of
the Speedy Trial Act in cases delayed by the need to obtain evidence abroad. See U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984, supra note 10,
ch. XII, pt. K, at 176-79.
30. The MLAT does allow information to be utilized in tax evasion cases if the United
States can demonstrate that high-level organized crime figures are the subject of the
investigation.
31. J. FEDDERS, J.B. HARRIS, R.M. OLSEN & B.A. RISTAu, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION:
PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO CONFLICTS AND AccOMODATIONS 1759-71 (1984) [hereinafter J.
FEDDERS](copies of correspondence between U.S. and Swiss judicial officials which address
these problems).
32. Frei, International mutual assistance in criminal matters: the Swiss Federal Act, 8
COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 794 (1982)(summarization of the Swiss legislation by Dr. Lionel
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have proved by far the most forthcoming in assisting foreign law
enforcement agencies.
33
As a result of the dramatic increase in the need for interna-
tional judicial assistance in criminal matters, the Justice Depart-
ment's Criminal Division created an Office of International Affairs
(OIA) in 1979. At about the same time, and in response to similiar
needs (as well as an increase in legal matters involving the intelli-
gence community), the Legal Adviser's Office in the State Depart-
ment added an Office of Law Enforcement and Intelligence (L/
LEI). Together, the individuals in these two offices have assumed
the lead in negotiating both legal assistance and extradition trea-
ties. They have been joined in their negotiations by representatives
from other agencies and sections with an interest in a specific
treaty, including the Narcotic and Dangerous Drugs Section in the
Criminal Division, the Tax Division, the Treasury Department,
and the SEC. OIA has also served as the consultant and channel
for most international requests, both incoming and outgoing, for
legal assistance in criminal matters. In addition, the Office of Citi-
zens Consular Services in the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA/
OCS/CCS) has worked in tandem with OIA in both processing let-
ters rogatory and attempting to obtain information and documents
through informal means.
Over the past few years, the United States has negotiated
eight other MLATs-with Turkey, the Netherlands, Colombia, It-
aly, Morocco, Canada, Thailand and the Cayman Islands. In addi-
tion, a number of other countries-including West Germany, Swe-
den, Jamaica, Panama, the Bahamas and Mexico-are in varying
stages of treaty negotiations with the United States. To date, only
the Turkish,3 4 Dutch 5 and Italian" treaties have entered into
Frei, Chief of the International Legal Assistance Section of the Swiss Federal Office for
Police Matters).
33. Recent developments, including the Swiss willingness to freeze the assets of fallen
dictators such as Ferdinand Marcos and Jean-Claude Duvalier, and to cooperate in U.S.
investigation of insider trading schemes, provide further evidence of their growing coopera-
tion. See Tagliabue, The Swiss Stop Keeping Secrets, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1986, § 3, at 4
col. 3; Swiss Banks Easing Secrecy, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1986, at D6, col. 4.; see also
Schapiro, Swiss Banks Stilt Sell Secrecy, Nation, Sept. 6, 1986, at 1 (more skeptical view).
34. Treaty on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 7, 1979, 32
U.S.T. 3111, T.I.A.S. No. 9891 (entered into force January 1, 1981). A section-by-section
analysis of the treaty is provided in TREATY WITH THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY ON EXTRADITION
AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, Sen. Exec. Rep. No. 18, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979).
35. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 12, 1981, T.I.A.S. No. 10734
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force. A combination of political and technical considerations have
held up Colombian ratification of their MLAT .3  The treaty with
Morocco is awaiting that country's ratification. 3  The treaties with
Canada and Thailand, both signed in March 1985, have yet to
work their way through legislative channels.3" The same is true of
the treaty negotiated with the British on behalf of the Caymans,
which was signed on July 3, 1986.
The selection of countries with which the United States has
negotiated MLATs has not always been determined purely by the
specific need for such a treaty.40 In the Turkish case, it was re-
quested in response to the United States' desire for a prisoner
transfer treaty. In other cases, MLAT negotiations have emerged
out of efforts to negotiate or re-negotiate extradition treaties in
which there was much greater interest. More recently, negotiations
have been prompted, and on occasion held up, by foreign govern-
ments' substantial concern and anger over American assertions of
judicial extraterritoriality (affectionately, and sometimes cynically,
referred to as "E.T.").
V. EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE CARIBBEAN: BRITISH
DEPENDENCIES PAST AND PRESENT
The essence of E.T. is the American claim of extraterritorial
effect of American laws. When this claim has been limited to
charging drug traffickers who have never entered the United States
(entered into force September 15, 1983). A section-by-section analysis of the treaty is pro-
vided in TREATY ON MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE WITH THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS,
Sen. Exec. Rep. No. 36, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
36. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, with a Memorandum of Under-
standing, Nov. 2, 1982, T.I.A.S. No.- (entered into force Nov. 13, 1985). A section-by-
section analysis of the treaty is provided in TREATY WITH THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC ON MUTUAL
ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, Sen. Exec. Rep. No. 36, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1985).
37. The treaty with Colombia, which may be renegotiated at the demand of the Colom-
bians, was signed in Washington, August 20, 1980. The text of the treaty, and a section-by-
section analysis, are provided in MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY WITH THE REPUBLIC OF
COLOMBIA, Sen. Exec. Rep. No. 35, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980) (Sen. Treaty Doc. 97-11).
38. The treaty with Morocco was signed at Rabat October 17, 1983. The text of the
treaty, and a section-by-section analysis, are provided in CONVENTION ON MUTUAL LEGAL
ASSISTANCE WITH THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO, Sen. Exec. Rep. No. 35, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1980) (Sen. Treaty Doc. 98-24).
39. The treaty with Canada was signed at Quebec March 18, 1985. It was the first
MLAT to be personally signed by a U.S. president. The treaty with Thailand was signed at
Bangkok the following day by the U.S. Attorney General, Edwin Meese III.
40. See Nadelmann, supra note 27 (fuller discussion of the events leading to MLAT
negotiations).
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with violation of American laws, it has not occasioned much objec-
tion from foreign governments. But when similar claims have im-
pinged on the freedom of foreign governments to pursue foreign
and economic policies of their choosing, acrimonious disputes have
resulted.41 Initially, the principal area of concern was legal actions
brought by American prosecutors and business competitors under
American antitrust laws. More recently, American efforts to im-
pede the flow of high-technology to the Soviet Union and to dis-
rupt the construction of the gas pipeline by European contractors
have generated substantial indignation. Perhaps the most perva-
sive example of E.T., however, has been the demands by U.S. pros-
ecutors for production of documents and other evidence located
abroad which are deemed necessary to government investigations
and court proceedings. Such demands, most often issued in the
form of subpoenas for documents or testimony, have placed the
recipients in the uncomfortable position of having to choose be-
tween complying, and thereby violating their own domestic law,
and refusing to comply and thereby being charged with contempt
by the American court. Indignant foreign governments have re-
sponded by enacting "Protection of Trading Interest" statutes,
otherwise referred to (by Americans) as "blocking statutes," that
forbid local banks and companies from complying with such de-
mands.4 2 The latest manifestation of conflict in this area has been
the reaction to the SEC's "waiver-by-conduct" proposal, under
which any investor who utilizes a foreign bank or brokerage firm to
buy or sell securities in a U.S. market would thereby waive his
right to keep his identity secret from the SEC and to withhold his
foreign bank accounts and trading secrets.43 Insofar as such a pro-
vision conflicts with the financial secrecy laws of a number of coun-
tries, the foreign reaction has been overwhelmingly negative. The
Swiss, according to one report, "told the SEC to abandon the pro-
posal or risk jeopardizing U.S.-Swiss agreements on law enforce-
ment."44 No doubt the two countries will work out the problem,
but the threat is indicative of the strains which American asser-
41. See Dam, Economic and Political Aspects of Extraterritoriality, 19 INT'L LAW. 887,
887 (1985)(Kenneth Dam, the former Deputy Secretary of State begins by stating, "Contro-
versies over the extraterritorial application of United States law have taken on increasing
importance in our foreign policy.").
42. See CRIME AND SECRECY, STAFF STUDY app., supra note 7 (selection of these and
other financial secrecy statutes).
43. See Ingersoll, SEC Proposal to Override Foreign Laws On Bank Secrecy Draws
Wide Criticism, Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1985, at 13, col. 1.
44. Id.
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tions of E.T. can generate.4
A major reason for asserting E.T. has been the frustration of
prosecutors and law enforcement agents in following the paper
trail of illicit activities once it leads abroad. More often than not,
the trail has led to Caribbean branches of European and Canadian
banks. American prosecutors have utilized a variety of techniques,
all of which have angered both Caribbean and European govern-
ments, in order to penetrate the financial secrecy laws which at-
tract the illicit revenues. They have subpoenaed a Cayman Island
bank official while he was visiting the United States;4 6 subpoenaed
attorneys and agents for a foreign corporation;" subpoenaed the
Miami branch of a Canadian bank for records maintained in the
bank's Bahamian, Caymanian, and Antiguan branches;4" subpoe-
naed the American subsidiary of a Swiss trading corporation for
records of the parent held in Switzerland; 49 and obtained a court
order compelling the target of an investigation to consent to dis-
closure of the records sought in the subpoena.50 American courts
have validated all of these techniques, often on the basis of a "bal-
ancing test" which has determined that the grand jury process and
American law enforcement interests outweigh the interests of the
foreign jurisdiction in maintaining financial secrecy. Of at least
equal concern to those jurisdictions has been the efforts of Ameri-
can law enforcement agents to secure information without benefit
of the courts, such as by the recruitment of informants. In one case
involving an IRS operation called "Project Pirate," a Caymanian
police official was induced to come to the United States and reveal
information in violation of Caymanian law. In another case involv-
45. See J. FEDDERS, supra note 31 (excellent collection of materials dealing with this
area).
46. United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
47. United States v. Bowe, 694 F.2d 1256 (11th Cir. 1982).
48. United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1119 (1983).
49. United States v. Marc Rich, 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215
(1983); see also Comment, International Paper Chase: Federal Grand Jury Subpoena Du-
ces Tecum in Conflict with Swiss Nondisclosure Law, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 149
(1985)(discussion of Marc Rich).
50. United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 328
(1984). The waiver concept was first accepted in United States v. Quigg, (unpublished opin-
ion, D. Ver. 1981), reprinted in J. FEDDERS, supra note 31, at 2174-80. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit's decision in Ghidoni has since been followed by the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Cid-Molina, 767 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1985) and, with some reservations, by the Second Cir-
cuit in United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985). See Culverhouse & Ross, Off-
shore Bank Accounts, CraM. JUST., Summer 1986, at 13 (brief discussion of the cases).
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ing "Project Haven," American law enforcement agents arranged
for the hotel room of a visiting Bahamian bank official in Miami to
be broken into, and the contents of his briefcase photographed.51
Employment of such methods did not preclude U.S. officials
from also utilizing the channels preferred by the FSJ governments.
This involved primarily the use of letters rogatory, which in turn
often required that local counsel be hired to pursue the requests in
the local courts. One notable example of the use of such channels
was the Interconex case, which involved a four-year paper chase
through Swiss and Caymanian courts. 2 Although the chase ulti-
mately proved successful, its cost in time and money persuaded
the Justice Department of the need to negotiate legal assistance
treaties and to seek alternative avenues for obtaining evidence.
Other requests were stymied by the unwillingness and inability of
foreign governments to obtain the requested documents, and by
the banks' practice of notifying the subject of an investigation of
the request, thus allowing him to move or otherwise disguise his
funds.53
In 1976, the Field case (involving the Caymanian banker who
was compelled to give testimony before a U.S. grand jury) per-
suaded the Cayman government to tighten its financial secrecy
laws and increase the sanctions for unauthorized disclosure.
5 4
When this proved ineffective in deterring American assertions of
E.T.,55 the Caymans' case was taken up by the British, who
represent them in their foreign policy, and by the Canadians,
whose banks were those principally affected. The motivations of
51. This case led to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Payner, 447 U.S.
727 (1980), holding that the violation of the banker's fourth amendment rights did not pre-
vent the information obtained from being used in prosecuting those whose names were re-
vealed as a result of the violation. See R. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE BY UNITED
STATES TAXPAYERs-AN OVERVIEW 114-15 (1981)(commonly referred to as "The Gordon Re-
port"); see also Tigar & Doyle, International Exchange of Information in Criminal Cases,
Transnational Aspects of Criminal Procedure, 1983 MICHIGAN YB. INTL' LEGAL STUD. 77.
52. The case is discussed in Shine, Transnational Litigation in Criminal Matters: A
Case Study of the Interconex Prosecution, in J. FEDDERS, supra note 31, at 533; see also
Olsen, Discovery in Federal Criminal Investigations, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 999 (1984);
Weiland, The Use of Offshore Institutions to Facilitate Criminal Activity in the United
States, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1115, 1122 (1984); Crime and Secrecy, Hearings, supra
note 7, at 109-111, 228-233.
53. J. FEDDERS, supra note 31. American financial institutions have frequently been
guilty of the same practice. See, e.g., THE CASH CONNECTION, supra note 9, at 34.
54. See R. GORDON, supra note 51, at 15-17.
55. None of the individuals interviewed by the author appeared to know of a case in
which Cayman authorities have prosecuted someone for violating the secrecy laws.
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the British, beyond their legal obligation to represent the Cay-
mans, included their concern for the economy of their dependency,
their general objection to any American exercise of E.T. as well as
to the principle of an American court presuming to "balance" the
interest of another country, and their attachment to the Tournier
principle of financial confidentiality."' The Canadians' motivations
overlapped with those of the British; in addition, they were upset
not only by the threats to their (politically influential) banks but
by the unilateral nature of the American actions despite Canada's
excellent record of cooperation in all other law enforcement mat-
ters.67 As for the Caymanians, their basic objective was to preserve,
by whatever means possible, their lucrative reputation as a reliable
FSJ's.
Two basic problems emerged as the E.T.-bank secrecy dispute
evolved during the late 1970's and into the 1980's. The first in-
volved how the United States would attempt to acquire informa-
tion and evidence. The second concerned which areas warranted
compromises in financial secrecy and which did not. Although a
number of the E.T. cases involved prosecutions for drug traffick-
ing, even more were Title 26 (tax evasion) cases, some of which
targeted drug traffickers. Other cases involved an array of Title 18
and other violations, ranging from mail, wire, securities and insur-
ance fraud to bribery, kickbacks, and illegal corporate campaign
contributions. 8 Given the taboos associated with the drug traffic,
all FSJ's were hard pressed to resist cooperating in this area. In-
deed, the United States could claim that the 1961 Single Conven-
tion on Narcotic Drugs, which most FSJ's had signed, mandated
cooperation in this area. Many FSJ's were also willing to supply
documents where the U.S. investigation centered on crimes that
were also recognizable under the FSJ's laws. Their discomfort be-
gan with the use of financial records to prosecute drug traffickers
56. The leading English case of Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank
states that there is a duty of confidentiality between a banker and his customers. See
Clarke, Bank Secrecy Jurisdictions in the English-Speaking Caribbean and Atlantic Re-
gions, in CRIME AND SECRECY, STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at 181-85.
57. April & Fried, Compelling Discovery and Disclosure in Transnational Litigation: A
Canadian View, 16 N.Y.U.J. Irr'L L. & POL. 961 (1984)(summary of some of the Canadian
views by one of the Canadian MLAT negotiators, Jonathan Fried); see Graham, QC, Reflec-
tions on United States Legal Imperialism: Canadian Sovereignty in the Context of North
American Economic Integration, 40 INT'L J. 478 (1985)(overview of the E.T. issue from the
Canadian perspective).
58. See R. BLUM, supra note 7, at 73-118 (sample listing of cases involving illicit off-
shore transactions).
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and other criminals on tax evasion charges connected with their
more serious crimes. It extended to include requests for coopera-
tion in cases involving insider trading, the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act, and violations of other U.S. laws that had no parallels in
the FSJ's criminal codes. When the American requests were based
on charges of no more than evasion of income tax on legally de-
rived revenue, most FSJ's absolutely refused to cooperate.
In October 1982, the United States, the British and the Cay-
man government entered into a Gentleman's Agreement to cooper-
ate in criminal investigations, such as of drug trafficking, where the
mutuality of offense requirement was met.59 The agreement, how-
ever, proved of limited utility in enhancing Caymanian cooperation
or preventing U.S. prosecutors from obtaining grand jury subpoe-
nas. o One year later, the issue finally came to a head after the
Cayman Grand Court twice enjoined the Bank of Nova Scotia from
releasing documents held in the Caymans. Under pressure from
the Bank of Nova Scotia, which was incurring substantial fines as a
result of its failure to comply with the subpoena, the British inter-
vened and obliged the Caymanian governor to order that the docu-
ments be disclosed.
The tensions generated by this and other E.T. issues led to a
November 1983 meeting between the American Deputy Secretary
of State, Kenneth Dam, and the British Minister for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, Malcolm Rifkind. One outcome of the
meeting was the establishment of a number of working groups to
resolve various disagreements over E.T. One of these was specifi-
cally tasked to examine the problem of Caribbean money launder-
ing. At about the same time, and in response to tensions over E.T.
with a number of governments, the Justice Department ordered
that all subpoenas to institutions in the United States for records
located abroad be cleared through OIA. (The order, issued by As-
sociate Attorney General D. Lowell Jensen, became known as "The
Jensen Memorandum.") The need for such a requirement was
readily apparent. It reflected the recognition that federal and other
prosecutors, in their quest for evidence, would utilize whichever
59. J. FEDDERS, supra note 31, at 737-43 (letters clarifying each government's interpre-
tation of the agreement).
60. Disagreement over the extent and significance of the agreement was ultimately re-
solved by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which deemed the agreement "not a bind-
ing, enforceable agreement but rather an experimental and tentative alternative for the pro-
duction of documents." See United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817, 829 (11th
Cir. 1984) (often referred to as "Nova Scotia II").
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means seemed most effective and expedient, regardless of their
broader consequences. By requiring that all international requests
be channeled through OIA, the Justice Department hoped to pro-
vide some coordination to the foreign policy of evidence gathering.
OIA could also inform prosecutors of more effective and less abra-
sive techniques for gathering evidence, some of which involved its
own informal arrangements with foreign counterparts. OIA's coor-
dinating role was also deemed necessary because of its role in nego-
tiating MLAT's as well as extradition and prisoner transfer trea-
ties. This role has required that the OIA negotiators not only be
familiar with the breadth of American requests for assistance, but
also that they be able to exercise some control over the flow be-
cause of their potential impact on negotiations as well as estab-
lished relationships. 1
Another outcome of the Dam-Rifkind meeting was the initia-
tion of negotiations between the United States and British officials
on a legal assistance agreement with the Cayman Islands. Unlike
the other MLAT's negotiated by the United States, this one was
limited, at the request of the British, to cooperation in narcotics
cases and predicated on the provisions against drug trafficking in
the international Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.6 2 American
law enforcement agencies were divided as to the advisability of ne-
gotiating a legal assistance treaty limited solely to drug investiga-
tions, but it was decided to accept the British condition. Two for-
mal negotiation sessions were held, in February and May 1984.
Each was followed by a session between the British team and the
Cayman Government. The Caymanians, under some pressure from
the British officials, accepted the necessity for an agreement but
expressed their concern that the agreement not provide a means
for the IRS to engage in "fishing expeditions."' 3 They also sought
to limit the use of subpoena duces tecum by American prosecutors
61. On occasion, the OIA negotiators have been unpleasantly surprised and embar-
rassed to discover an unknown request from some prosecutor generating tensions with their
counterparts from abroad. Prior to the issue of the Jensen memorandum, prosecutors were
not even required to consult, much less seek approval from, OIA before obtaining a sub-
poena for records held abroad. The only ostensible requirement was contained in the infre-
quently read U.S. Attorney's Manual. It required that prosecutors check with the Justice
Department before taking any action that might have an impact on foreign relations.
62. The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, done Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407,
T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 (entered into force December 13, 1964; for the United
States, June 24, 1967).
63. They were, however, willing to permit information which they provided to be used
to prosecute drug traffickers on title 26 charges.
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seeking evidence. The American negotiators responded to the first
concern by agreeing that the Attorney General would certify that
any request was for a narcotics-related prosecution. In what consti-
tuted their principal concession, the Americans also agreed to
waive their prerogative of obtaining a subpoena duces tecum and
to confine their requests in narcotics cases to the procedures speci-
fied in the agreement.
4
The agreement was signed by the British and U.S. govern-
ments on July 26, 1984 and entered into force on August 29, when
the Caymanian implementing legislation took effect."5 Little more
than a year later, over fifty requests had already been transmitted.
Most of these were processed quite rapidly, for a number of rea-
sons. Unlike the MLAT with the Swiss, the Cayman agreement
specified that any American request be kept confidential by both
the Cayman Attorney-General and the provider of the documents.
So too, the legislation implementing the agreement did not provide
for the extensive procedural hurdles which have hampered Swiss
compliance with American requests. Finally, the typical MLAT re-
quirement that a request be accompanied by supporting docu-
ments was waived in the Cayman agreement. All that was required
was a certificate by the U.S. Attorney General stating that the re-
quest fell within the scope of the agreement.6e Each of these provi-
sions, as well as the fact that it was entirely one-sided, represented
significant advantages over a typical MLAT from the American
perspective. For this reason, some U.S. officials were reluctant to
trade in the executive agreement for a full-fledged MLAT with the
Caymans.
64. The waiver of the subpoena option was viewed sceptically by those with less faith in
the effectiveness of international agreements. The agreement did not, however, prevent the
Americans from obtaining subpoenas in non-narcotics cases.
65. Exchange of Letters Between the United Kingdom and the United States Concern-
ing the Cayman Islands and Matters Connected with Resulting from any Narcotics Activity
Referred to in the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 as Amended by the Protocol
Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. The Agreement can be found at
24 I.L.M. 1110 (1985). The Caymanian implementing legislation is reproduced at 24 I.L.M.
937 (1985). Because the agreement was an executive agreement rather than a full-fledged
MLAT, the Senate's ratification was not required. See generally Comment, Piercing Off-
shore Bank Secrecy Laws Used to Launder Illegal Narcotics Profits: The Cayman Islands
Example, 20 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 133 (1985)(discussion of events and cases).
66. Indeed, the reluctance of prosecutors to supply evidence in support of a request
under a MLAT (or a letter rogatory for that matter) has been a principal limitation of the
MLAT process. That reluctance has stemmed from the fear that the information would be
released-because of corruption, carelessness, or legal process-thus jeopardizing the suc-
cess of the investigation and/or the source of the information.
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Article 7 of the Cayman agreement stipulated, however, that
the signatories enter into full-fledged MLAT negotiations before
the end of 1985. During the first half of 1986, further negotiating
sessions were held in London and Washington. On July 3, the com-
pleted MLAT was signed in Georgetown, Grand Cayman by repre-
sentatives of the U.S., British, and Cayman governments."e It was
the first between the United States and a Caribbean FSJ, as well
as the first MLAT of any kind signed by the British. The principal
disadvantage from the U.S. perspective was that the Attorney Gen-
eral's certification could no longer substitute for the need to pro-
vide supporting documents spelling out the alleged offense. A sig-
nificant advantage, however, was that assistance was no longer
limited to drug cases. Indeed, the British even agreed to cooperate
in cases, such as insider trading and violations of the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act, in which the mutuality of offense requirement
was not met. Although tax offenses were explicitly excluded from
the scope of the treaty, the British also agreed that evidence pro-
vided by Caymanian authorities could be used for tax prosecutions
predicated on other offenses.
Among Caymanians, debate over the treaty has been heated,
as it was following the signing of the 1984 agreement. In an elec-
tion held a few months after the agreement went into effect, the
accord with the United States was a major campaign issue. Many
of those in the government were ousted from office. Some observ-
ers suspected that the signing of the agreement was responsible,
and that the old government was perceived as having gone soft,
caving in to pressures exerted by the Americans and the British.65
Despite the fallout from the 1984 agreement, and despite heated
debate over the new MLAT, the Cayman legislature passed the
necessary implementing legislation only weeks after the treaty was
signed. The British approval process is expected to involve nothing
more than formalities. Ratification by the U.S. Senate is all that
remains to effect the treaty. Although no political objections are
anticipated, the process of submitting MLAT's to the Senate has
proven to be a time-consuming one. In all likelihood, the MLAT
67. Treaty Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the United States of America Concerning the Cayman Islands Relating to Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters. See Nash, U.S. and Caymans Sign Crime Pact, N.Y.
Times, July 4, 1986, at D10, col. 2.
68. Conflicting reports also suggested either that the police chief of the Caymans had
been forced out of office for appearing too forthcoming with the Americans, or that he had
merely retired in due course.
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with the Caymans will become effective in 1987.
The paramount question, not only in the eyes of the Caymani-
ans but in those of all other FSJ's as well, has been the impact of
the agreement on the Caymans' bank industry. Some bankers have
suggested that an outflow of funds to Panama and other FSJ's fol-
lowed the signing of the initial agreement. Others have indicated
that the outflow has been negligible, and that in fact the agree-
ment benefited the Caymans' reputation and attracted business.
Given the general agreement that drug money constitutes only a
small proportion of all FSJ's funds, the latter reports are easily
plausible. Their credence is substantiated by the fact that the in-
crease in funds held by Swiss banks did not abate after the signing
of their MLAT. According to recent reports, the number of banks
opening branches in the Cayman Islands continues to climb. Just
days before the MLAT was signed, an article appeared in The
Miami Herald on the Cayman banking industry, its title: Caymans
grow as "Geneva of the Caribbean."9
Both the agreement and the treaty with the Caymans were ex-
pected to serve as models for future agreements with other FSJ's,
particularly those, like the Caymans, that remain dependencies of
the British. At the signing of the initial agreement, Malcolm
Rifkind suggested that the Cayman agreement might be repeated
with a number of the other Caribbean dependencies such as An-
guilla, the British Virgin Islands, Montserrat, and the Turks and
Caicos Islands. This assurance was repeated by British officials in a
diplomatic note in June 1985 and again at the signing of the Cay-
man MLAT in July 1986.
In March 1985, the Turks and Caicos Islands hit the front
page of American newspapers when its chief minister and two
other high-ranking officials were arrested in a DEA undercover op-
eration in Miami on drug trafficking charges.70 Although the arrest
69. Russell, Caymans Grow as "Geneva of the Caribbean," Miami Herald, June 22,
1986, at F1, col. 2.
70. See Nordheimer, Head of Isles Near Bahamas Accused of Drug Plot, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 6, 1985, at Al, col. 4; Balmaseda, Remote Islands' Top Officials Held in Drug Smug-
gling Plot, Miami Herald, Mar. 6, 1985, at Al, col. 1; Thornton, Caribbean Prime Minister
Arrested in Miami on Drug Charges, Washington Post, Mar. 6, 1985, at A16, col. 4. The
reaction to the arrest in the Turks and Caicos was split, with many people angered by the
arrest and the fact that the resident British governor had cooperated with the DEA. See
Tomb, Drug Arrests of Three Top Ministers Divide Poverty-Stricken Islands, Miami Her-
ald, Mar. 12, 1985, at Al, col. 4; Thornton, Drug Arrests Raise Islands' Tension, Washing-
ton Post, Mar. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 4; Treaster, In Old Pirate Haunt, Daunting News of
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may not have been a determining factor, negotiations between the
British and the Americans focused on the Turks and Caicos as the
next target for a drug cooperation agreement. No doubt the fact
that the islands had long been linked to drug smuggling, and that
they had become probably the second largest of the British FSJ's
in the Caribbean after the Caymans, also contributed to the deci-
sion to focus on the Turks and Caicos. On September 18, 1986,
American and British negotiators signed an agreement that was
virtually identical to the one signed two years earlier concerning
the Caymans."' Within weeks, the legislature of the Turks and Cai-
cos had passed the necessary implementing legislation. Since ratifi-
cation of the agreement by the U.S. Senate was not necessary, the
agreement entered into effect in October 1986. It is reasonable to
assume that similar agreements will be negotiated with the other
three British FSJ dependencies in the near future. Indeed, both
Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands already have passed the
necessary implementing legislation in anticipation of the signing of
similar agreements on their behalf.
Together with the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas has been
identified as a principal FSJ utilized by drug traffickers and other
criminals.7 1 Until late 1984, its government proved at least as unco-
operative as that of the Caymans in refusing to provide assistance
to American investigations.73 In turn, the Justice Department pur-
sued a confrontational approach in its efforts to obtain information
and evidence. Efforts to improve cooperation in this area were con-
tinually hampered by a number of factors, including extensive
high-level corruption, tension over American law enforcement op-
erations in the Bahamas targeted at corrupt officials, and exposes
in the American media regarding both these issues. During late
1983, matters came to a head when American DEA and FBI agents
were declared persona non grata and when reports of high-level
government involvement in drug trafficking obliged Prime Minister
Pindling to set up an independent Commission of Inquiry.74
Drug Trade, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1985, at A2, col. 3.
71. Shenon, Pact Gives U.S. Access to Data in Drug Haven, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19,
1986, at B2, col. 1.
72. See CRIME AND SECRECY, STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at 54-62 (discussion of the
Bahamas); R. BLUM, supra note 7, at 133-46 (discussion of the Bahamas).
73. Stuart, US.-Bahamian Relations Are Straining Under Drug Investigations, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 28, 1983, at A21, col. 1.
74. One explosive expos6 was delivered by NBC Nightly News on September 5, 1983. It
cited American officials who claimed that major drug traffickers, reportedly including the
infamous fugitive, Robert Vesco, were paying off Bahamian officials including the prime
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By late 1984, both governments had begun to reverse direction
and restore their relationship. American law enforcement agents
were invited back and joint drug enforcement operations under-
taken. At about the same time, the Commission of Inquiry com-
pleted its report.' Among its recommendations were that a MLAT
be negotiated, and "that problems connected with the revenue laws
of the United States . . .be set aside when negotiating an agree-
ment to trace drug related funds.""6 Accordingly, MLAT negotia-
tions began in January 1985. As this article went to press, Baha-
mian officials anticipated that an MLAT agreement similar to that
concerning the Caymans would be signed before the end of 1986.
Unlike the Cayman situation, however, the principal U.S. concern
in the Bahamas has continued to be not with drug money launder-
ing but with the transshipment of marijuana and cocaine from Co-
lombia through the Bahamian archipelago. By late 1986, both the
Reagan administration and Congress were complimenting the
Pindling Government on its apparently wholehearted cooperation
in drug enforcement matters.7
VI. TRYING TO CLOSE THE DOOR ON DIRTY MONEY: THE CASE OF
PANAMA
The FSJ of greatest present concern to the United States is,
without doubt, Panama. It is regarded as the preferred haven of
Latin American drug traffickers. (The English-speaking Caymans
and Bahamas are supposedly preferred by the "Anglo" traffickers
and other English-speaking criminals.) Its secrecy laws are the
least penetrable of virtually all FSJ's. Unlike the Bahamas, where
corruption in high places is tempered by a reputable court system
and a substantial percentage of honest law enforcement agents and
other government officials, Panama is often viewed as corrupt to
minister. A second NBC Nightly News Report, on February 22, 1984, cited a DEA report in
which Prime Minister Pindling was reported to have taken bribes from a Colombian
trafficker.
75. Many of the Commission's findings were detailed in a thorough report on corrup-
tion in the Bahamas that appeared in The Miami Herald in late 1984. See Hiaasen & Mc-
Gee, A Nation for Sale, Miami Herald, Sept. 23-28, 1984 (six-part series).
76. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY (APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE ILLEGAL
USE OF THE BAHAMAS FOR THE TRANS-SHIPMENT OF DANGEROUS DRUGS DESTINED FOR THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. NOVEMBER 1983-DECEMBER 1984), BAHAMAS (DECEMBER 1984)
at 285. The Commission also noted that the United States had failed to respond to earlier
proposals by Attorney General Paul Adderley to enter into negotiations. Id. at 353-56.
77. See Brinkley, In Fighting Drug Traffic, Attitude Wins the Aid, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7,
1986, at A28, col. 3.
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the hilt. According to various reports, the proper connections and
payoffs can insure that drug money flown into the country is
greeted at military airstrips and transported (by Brink armored
trucks) directly to the designated bank.78 It is assumed that this
could not continue without the permission of the effective ultimate
authority in the country, General Manuel Antonio Noriega, to
whom all military and law enforcement agencies report. As one
commentator has written, the Panamanian Defense Force "has be-
come, by common consent among Panamanians, a well-oiled ma-
chine that runs on corruption, drug deals and sufficient power to
impose or depose five presidents in the last three years. '79
Until recently, the Panamanian Defense Force and the bank-
ing and business communities had firmly resisted American pres-
sures to provide exceptions to their secrecy laws. Their motives
have been viewed cynically by American law enforcement agents.
Unlike the Swiss, who point to Nazi efforts to identify and seize
Jewish assets in Swiss banks as the original basis for their financial
secrecy statutes, or the Commonwealth FSJ's, whose secrecy roots
lie in the common law banker/customer privilege of confidentiality,
Panama's lucrative laws stem strictly from a desire to foster busi-
ness. They have rejected any principles which might create excep-
tions to those same laws. Panamanian law is strictly territorial in
its approach to crimes committed abroad. Unless a crime under
Panamanian law has been committed in Panama, there is no legal
authority for their law enforcement agencies or prosecutors (fis-
cales) to cooperate. Although Panama has cooperated against drug
trafficking per se, it has drawn a clear line at providing any finan-
cial or other protected records.8
Nonetheless, Panama's political, military, and banking leaders
have repeatedly claimed that they would be willing to cooperate in
financial investigations of drug traffickers if a way could be found
to do so without harming the country's reputation for banking se-
crecy. They argue that only a small percentage of the assets held in
their banks derive from drug trafficking. Their principal concern is
not that they will lose the few billions which drug traffickers have
78. See, e.g., Penn, Panama Is Becoming Top Spot to Deposit Illegal Narcotics Profits,
Wall St. J. Nov. 3, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
79. LeMoyne, The Opposition Takes Cover in Panama, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, at
E3, col. 1; see also CRIME AND SECRECY, STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at 77-85 (discussion of
Panama); R. BLUM, supra note 7, at 147-60 (discussion of Panama).
80. The one much cited exception was the access to records which Panama offered to
U.S. authorities investigating the massacre in Jonestown, Guyana.
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deposited in Panama to other FSJ's, but that any MLAT with the
United States will be misperceived by other depositors as a poten-
tial threat to the confidentiality of their accounts. Given the nu-
merous attractions of Panama's well-developed financial industry,
including its sophisticated communications facilities, easy access to
all Latin America, and time-tested secrecy laws, their concerns
may well be exaggerated.
Although no one doubts that Panama plays a significant role
in the drug money laundering area, there is no reliable evidence
regarding the total amounts of drug and other illicitly earned
money laundered through the country's banks. Explanations vary,
for instance, regarding the billion-plus surplus of dollars which the
Panama National Bank ships to the U.S. Federal Reserve each
year. Indeed, the entire question of how cash dollars move
throughout the international financial system is one replete with
speculation and uncertainty. Although there is general agreement
that most legitimate business transactions of any size do not re-
quire the use of cash, there are any number of reasons why people
engaged in essentially legitimate business transactions might util-
ize cash. Typically, the explanation is that they have something to
hide, either from tax authorities or from other fiscal authorities en-
forcing currency control regulations. In the shaky and inflation-rid-
den economies of Latin America and elsewhere, dollars often re-
present the best hedge against inflation, overvalued exchange rates,
political instability, and the avarice of governments. In countries in
which letters of credit drawn on national banks are often not ac-
cepted, it also represents one of the few unchallengeable instru-
ments of financial exchange.
Of course, relying on dollars to conduct financial transactions
can be quite problematic. Large amounts of dollars are bulky; they
present serious security problems; and they produce no income. It
is assumed that most dollars transported abroad to be laundered
eventually find their way back to the United States. More often
than not, the route back is via correspondent bank accounts which
foreign banks and branch offices maintain in the United States.
American law enforcement agencies acknowledge that the CTR
and CMIR requirements have not proven very effective in record-
ing the volume of these inter-bank cash flows. Even when the
proper forms are filled out, they only indicate which banks are en-
gaging in large-scale dollar transactions-not where those dollars
came from in the first place.
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Among the few certainties in this area is that a few FSJ's, in-
cluding Panama, Switzerland, the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands,
and Hong Kong, are responsible for the vast majority of dollar
shipments to the United States from abroad.8 1 It is impossible to
say what percentage of this is drug money. In the case of Panama,
a number of other considerations complicate the analysis. First,
Panama utilizes the American dollar as its national currency, thus
making any comparisons with other countries, and inferences
about the percentage of smaller-denomination bills being shipped
to the United States, of ambiguous significance.82 Second, the pres-
ence of the Col6n Free Zone, which attracts the cash business of
drug traffickers, high-tech smugglers and legitimate businessmen
alike, ensures a substantial flow of dollars through the country.
Third, flight capital from the rest of Latin America is generally
acknowledged as the source of most of the $35 billion deposited in
Panamanian banks.83 The bottom line of Panamanian policy is
that nothing will be done which might endanger the continued
presence of those deposits in their banks.
One argument which American negotiators have advanced in
their negotiations with FSJ's, and in particular with Panama, is
that refusing to accept dirty money, such as money from drug traf-
fickers, is a prerequisite to establishing a reputation as a secure
and legitimate financial haven. Cleaning up their reputation, they
have argued, would attract more than enough funds to compensate
for the flight of dirty money deposits. Leading members of the
banking community, particularly among the representatives of
multinational foreign banks, have proven receptive to this argu-
ment. They must contend, however, with the vested interests
which continue to profit from the drug traffic. These include not
only members of the banking community, particularly among the
local banks, but also military officers and politicians who receive
"gratuities" from the traffickers for facilitating the laundering of
81. The information available indicates that, "for example, in 1982, the total shipments
of U.S. currency to and from West Germany amounted to $12 million, and shipments to and
from France amounted to $8.8 million." THE CASH CONNECTION, supra note 9, at 17. Those
amounts represent less than one percent of the totals being shipped from some of the FSJ's.
82. Over a billion dollars per year is shipped to the Federal Reserve in the United
States by the National Bank of Panama, which acts as a clearinghouse for dollars received
and disbursed by Panamanian banks. An additional amount is exported directly by banks in
Panama to correspondent and other banks in the United States and elsewhere.
83. An estimated $30 billion represents foreign holdings. The total of offshore liquid
investment by the Latin American private sector is estimated at $60 to $75 billion. See Silk,
Latin Nations' Capital Flight, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1985, at D2, col. 1.
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their money.
Beyond negotiating MLAT's, an additional response of the
FSJ's to the problem of money laundering has been the promise
and occasional implementation of legislation and regulations which
address the issue.8 4 The Swiss have taken the lead in this respect,
with both the government and the banking community itself in-
volved in regulating the financial industry. One notable component
has been a Convention on Diligence which requires bankers to
properly identify all new depositors and assure that their deposits
are not criminally derived.8 The Caymans, and to a lesser extent
the Bahamas, have also increased their self-regulation in recent
years. The British and Canadian governments appear to have en-
couraged this process, in good part because many of the more
prominent banks are headquartered in their countries.
Panama has lagged somewhat in this regard. Its banking in-
dustry is largely homegrown, like the Swiss, but without the same
standards of conduct. The British and Canadian multinational
banks, with their increasing interest in stepped-up regulation, are
largely absent. The publication in early 1985 of a Code of Ethics
by the Panama Banking Association (the bankers' private associa-
tion) was viewed by some as a step in the right direction, and by
others as a mere sop to appease the Americans and deter action by
the government. The impression of one leading banker is that
there are no more than five to eight banks in the country that
would turn away a million dollars in cash, although reports have
surfaced of people having difficulty finding a reputable bank to ac-
cept hundreds of thousands of dollars with no questions asked.
The Panama Banking Commission, which oversees the manage-
ment of the nation's banks, is primarily concerned with loan port-
folios and pays scant attention to the sources of banks' deposits.
At most, they want to ensure that banks are not taken over by
drug traffickers or other organized criminal elements.
The greatest hope of the United States may lie with the for-
eign bankers and their perception that cleaning up Panama's repu-
tation is in their interest. Led by a representative of a Swiss bank,
a number of foreign bankers have assumed a leading role in draft-
ing the code of ethics and encouraging local banks to abide by its
84. See CRIME AND SECRECY, STAFF STUDY, supra note 7; R. BLUM, supra note 7 (discus-
sion of the efforts of the FSJ's in this area).
85. See R. BLUM, supra note 7, at 163.
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provisions. Their influence and expertise is such that they have
participated directly in Panama's MLAT negotiations with the
United States. This exceeds even the role which Swiss banks
played in their government's MLAT negotiations with the United
States, when the bankers were actively consulted but not included.
Indeed, any public/private distinction in describing the members
of the Panamanian negotiating team is ambiguous because of the
overlapping and revolving-door nature of government service and
private sector activity in Panama.
In late 1984, Nicolas Barletta, one of the principal founders of
Panama's banking industry, was elected to the presidency (in an
election reportedly fixed by the military). At first, the prospects for
negotiating an MLAT appeared to improve. Two negotiation ses-
sions took place in December 1984 and May 1985. On March 1,
1985, the government seized a bank involved in money launder-
ing.8 6 Leading members of the Panama Banking Association as-
sured U.S. negotiators that they would support the MLAT process.
To avoid antagonizing the Panamanians, the Justice Department
denied prosecutors' requests for Nova Scotia-type subpoenas to
obtain information held in Panama.8 7 Most indications appeared
favorable.
In late September 1985, however, the presidential revolving
door swung again. When President Barletta suggested that an in-
dependent commission be appointed to investigate a murder which
most Panamanians believed had been sanctioned by the military,
he was forced to resign from office.8 8 With the MLAT negotations
once again derailed, the Justice Department reversed stride and
assented to prosecutor requests for Nova Scotia-type subpoenas.
Some months later, two new developments heightened the pressure
on the Panamanian government to respond to U.S. concerns. On
April 21, 1986, Reagan administration officials, including Assistant
Secretary of State Elliott Abrams and Customs and DEA agents,
testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee for In-
ter-American affairs, chaired by Senator Jesse Helms. The law en-
forcement officials in particular spoke bluntly of the Panamanian
86. The bank was the First Interamericas Bank, owned by a DEA fugitive, Gilberto
Rodriquez Orejuela. The seizure resulted from a joint American-Panamanian investigation.
87. The controversial subpoenas are delivered to U.S. branches of international banks
for records held in the banks' FSJ branches. See United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691
F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983).
88. See Le Moyne, Elements in Ouster of Panama Chief: Beheading and a Power
Duel, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1985, at A12, col. 1.
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Defense Force's domination of local politics and its role in drug
trafficking and money laundering operations. 9 Two months later,
the investigative reporter, Seymour Hersh, brought General
Noriega's face to the front page of U.S. newspapers with an expos6
on the Panamanian leader's involvement in drug trafficking, arms
smuggling, and money laundering.90 Drawing on evidence compiled
by the American intelligence community, Hersh revealed that al-
though the intelligence agencies had known of Noriega's involve-
ment in such activities for some time, they had refrained from act-
ing against him because of his valuable cooperation in other
intelligence matters. Sentiment had gradually shifted, however, as
evidence of Noriega's illicit activities mounted and as it became
apparent that the general was regarded as a highly valuable intelli-
gence source by the Cuban Government as well.
Apparently the two developments had the desired effect.
Barletta's successor, former Vice President Eric Arturo Delvalle,
renewed discussions between his government and U.S. officials over
enhancing cooperation in drug and money laundering cases. In
June, a U.S. delegation visited Panama; two months later, the Pan-
amanian Attorney General, Carlos A. Villalaz, headed a delegation
to Washington. Little progress was made as the Panamanians
continued to resist the notion of a MLAT, which they contended
would threaten their banking industry. Instead, they outlined to
U.S. officials a bill that the government would introduce in the Na-
tional Assembly when the legislature reconvened on October 1,
1986. Although the proposed legislation provides for stiff penalties
for bank transactions related to drug trafficking, it apparently is
not sufficient to appease the U.S. government.9 2 No doubt the
American skepticism can be explained in good part by the suscep-
tibility of Panama's criminal justice system to political and finan-
cial influences. While the United States may welcome promises by
Latin American governments to punish drug traffickers themselves,
experience has demonstrated that there is no substitute for prose-
cution in a U.S. federal court.
All indications strongly suggest that vested interests in Pan-
89. See Chardy, U.S. Voices Concern over Military's Role in Panama, Miami Herald,
Apr. 22, 1986, at A3, col. 1.
90. Hersh, Panama Strongman Said to Trade in Drugs, Arms and Illicit Money, N.Y.
Times, June 12, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
91. These developments are recounted in Labrut, U.S., Panama Still Feud Over Bank
Secrecy, Miami Herald, Aug. 18, 1986, at BMI9, col. 1.
92. See id. (description of the proposed legislation).
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ama are primarily interested in putting off the inevitable for as
long as possible, and in reaping the maximum possible benefits in
the short run. Panama's rulers cannot help but recognize that, de-
spite all the rhetoric, drugs and money laundering are not the lead-
ing priority of the U.S. government insofar as Panama is con-
cerned. Foremost among American priorities is the continued
security of the canal. That is followed by the desire to ensure Pan-
amanian cooperation with U.S. policies in Central America, and by
a general desire for political stability in Panama. Evidence linking
General Noriega with the Cubans, and with arms supplies to com-
munist guerrillas in Colombia, suggest that the Americans may in-
creasingly view the general as expendable, provided a friendly suc-
cessor can be assured. But even politics aside, the widespread
resistance to a MLAT among Panamanians will be difficult to over-
come. The examples provided by Switzerland, the Caymans and
other Caribbean FSJ's cannot help but assuage some of the fears of
Panama's banking leaders. In the final analysis, however, it seems
that the United States will be obliged to pursue tougher policies
against Panama to secure greater cooperation against money laun-
dering. Panama promises to be one of the most problematic of
FSJ's for U.S. law enforcement agencies for some time to come.
VII. LAUNDERING MONEY TO EVADE TAXES
There was some confusion among the Panamanians when they
first began considering a MLAT: they thought that it would allow
them to qualify for certain benefits under the Caribbean Basin Ini-
tiative (CBI). When Congress enacted the CBI in mid-1983, it at-
tached a number of conditions intended to induce greater coopera-
tion in law enforcement matters." Those countries wishing to
become beneficiaries of the duty-free treatment provided for in the
CBI were required to take steps to cooperate with the United
States against drug trafficking and in the extradition of American
citizens."' Most countries, including Panama (but excluding the
Bahamas), were quickly deemed to have met this requirement and
were appropriately designated. In addition, a further incentive was
attached to the CBI in the form of an amendment to section 274 of
the Internal Revenue Code allowing tax-deductible conventions to
be held in the Caribbean. Eligibility for this potential boon to their
93. See Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2701 (Supp. II 1984).
94. Id. §§ 2701(a)(2), (b)(6) & (7).
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tourist industry was contingent on the Caribbean government ne-
gotiating an agreement with the Treasury Department providing
for the exchange of information necessary to enforce the tax laws
of the United States (and the beneficiary country). The requisite
exchange would include "information which may otherwise be sub-
ject to nondisclosure provisions of the local law of the beneficiary
country such as provisions respecting bank secrecy and bearer
shares." 9
Jamaica was the first to become eligible for the convention tax
benefit, although it did so even before the CBI benefits were for-
mally extended by negotiating a protocol to its pre-existing tax
convention with the United States.9 On November 3, 1984, Barba-
dos became the first country to avail itself of the CBI benefits
when it signed an exchange of information agreement that met the
terms of the Initiative.9 7 Barbados' principal incentive, however,
was not the convention tax benefit, but a 1984 amendment to the
Tax Code allowing potentially lucrative Foreign Sale Corporations
(FSC's) to be set up in whichever countries agreed to the exchange
of information agreement."' By mid-1985, a similar agreement had
been reached with Costa Rica, but it had yet to be ratified over a
year later.
The most recent of the FSJ's to sign an exchange of tax infor-
mation agreement is Bermuda. The British dependency in the At-
lantic has traditionally exercised far greater autonomy in its for-
eign relations than Britain's Caribbean dependencies. It also has
proven atypical in a number of other respects: its economy is
stronger than most; its financial sector is better developed and
more self-regulated; its government is more forthcoming, even to
the point of taking the initiative, in criminal investigations; and its
leadership is generally more sophisticated and honest than most.
In 1984, the Bermudan government expressed concern that U.S.
law enforcement efforts in the Caribbean might increase the flow
of drugs and dirty money through Bermuda. It sought greater co-
operation with the United States in preventing this, and also ex-
pressed interest in obtaining the CBI benefits. Negotiations fol-
96. I.R.C. § 274(h)(6)(C) (1982).
96. Protocol Amending the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income, July 17, 1981, T.I.A.S. No.
10207 (entered into force December 29, 1981).
97. Agreement for the Exchange of Information with respect to Taxes, November 3,
1984, T.I.A.S. No. - (entered into force November 3, 1984).
98. See I.R.C. § 921 (1984).
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lowed, culminating on July 11, 1986 when an extensive bilateral
tax agreement was signed."'
The relevance of these agreements to the problem of launder-
ing drug money remains uncertain. At the very least, they provide
an additional weapon which IRS agents can use to pursue drug
traffickers and their assets. They also suggest that the signatory
governments would be forthcoming in MLAT negotiations if the
need for such treaties arose.' 00 The real breakthrough, however,
will occur in the unlikely event that a leading FSJ signs such an
agreement. None of the countries which have thus far signed on
are regarded as significant FSJ's. The one exception, to some ex-
tent, is Costa Rica, which was suspected of trying to position itself
as a future FSJ should Panama falter for any reason. Of the lead-
ing FSJ's in the Caribbean, the Cayman Islands has expressed lit-
tle interest in the CBI inducements, and Panama's tourist industry
is probably too insignificant to warrant sacrificing the substantial
business which the banking industry would lose.
The only potential candidate with even an outside chance of
signing such an agreement is the Bahamas; its doing so would re-
present a dramatic turnabout from the very recent past. Only in
early 1985 was it approved for the minimum duty-free treatment
which almost all other intended beneficiaries of the CBI had al-
ready received. The administration had delayed the designation
until the Bahamas offered greater assistance in opposing drug traf-
ficking. The willingness of the Pindling Government in early 1985
to participate in a joint interdiction campaign, to let DEA agents
return to the islands, and to commence MLAT negotiations, all
contributed to the designation. The only reason that the Bahamas
can be viewed as a potential candidate for the exchange of tax in-
formation agreement is that an estimated seventy-five percent of
its legitimate GNP is derived from tourism, and seventy-five per-
cent of its two million tourists each year are American citizens.' 0 '
This contrasts with the estimated thirteen to fifteen percent (and
99. Convention Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland (On Behalf of the Government of Bermuda) and the Government of the
United States of America Relating to the Taxation of Insurance Enterprises and Mutual
Assistance in Tax Matters.
100. Other positive indications can be detected in the growing number of tax conven-
tions which include language providing for cooperation in cases of "fraud" or which explic-
itly require cooperation in criminal prosecutions for tax offenses.
101. House Foreign Relations Committee, Memorandum on a Staff Study Mission to
the Bahamas (November 3, 1983).
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1,200 to 2,000 jobs) which the financial sector contributes.' None-
theless, it is far from clear that the benefit to the tourist industry
would outweigh the substantial cost to the financial sector. Any
attempt to persuade the Bahamas to negotiate such an agreement
would run up against not only the political power of the financial
sector but the principle of bank secrecy as well. Even the Commis-
sion of Inquiry, after reviewing the problem of money laundering,
stated that, "[T]he Bahamas should not be instrumental in the en-
forcement of the taxation laws of another country."' 03 As of late
1986, the Bahamian government continued to express little interest
in negotiating a tax agreement with the United States.
The U.S. Treasury Department, which is responsible for nego-
tiating the CBI and other tax agreements, has not been an enthusi-
astic advocate of using tax provisions to prosecute drug traffickers
and other criminals. Unlike the Justice Department, the Treasury
Department's traditional concern has focused not on the criminal
prosecution of tax offenders but on the collection of revenue. An-
other institutional disposition has been opposition to the use of tax
incentives to accomplish non tax-related objectives, particularly
when those incentives exist outside the United States. The ex-
change-of-information provisions in the CBI thus reflect, in part, a
trade-off which the revenue collectors demanded. The provisions
also, however, represented a growing recognition within the Trea-
sury Department that improved information exchange is necessary,
both to counter the increasing use of offshore tax shelters and to
compensate for the lax enforcement of tax laws in many other
countries.' °0 Lastly, although the tax sections of the Treasury De-
partment have remained primarily concerned with civil audits,
there is a growing realization of the role which criminal sanctions
and enforcement can play in inducing compliance with U.S. tax
laws.
Coordination between the Justice and Treasury Departments
in this area has increased from nil to a minimal level as the Trea-
sury perspective has shifted. Treasury Department negotiators
have continued to focus on the avoidance of double taxation as
102. See CRIME AND SECRECY, STAFF STUDY, supra note 7, at 55; R. BLUM, supra note 7,
at 135.
103. See COMMISSION OF INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 76, at 285.
104. The increasing use of offshore tax shelters had stemmed in part from anti-tax shel-
ter provisions introduced into the Tax Code in recent years, and the need for tax shelter
promoters to go offshore where the IRS lacked compulsory process.
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their principal concern in tax convention negotiations. But they
are also coming to recognize the importance of exchange-of-infor-
mation provisions to the Justice Department and even to some of
their own concerns. The two departments also have a mutual inter-
est, as the Panama case demonstrated, in avoiding any mispercep-
tion by the FSJ's that the MLATs and CBI tax exchange agree-
ments are related. Neither agreement directly harms the interests
of either department since both agreements aid in the prosecution
of drug traffickers and others on tax charges and discourage
criminals from utilizing signatory countries to launder their dirty
money. The possibility exists, however, that the negotiation of one
may advance or prejudice the chances of negotiating the other.
The list of FSJ's is extensive and varied, both within and
without the Caribbean, depending on which features one employs
in characterizing a jurisdiction as such. 0 5 Within the Caribbean,
different lists include not only the Cayman Islands, the Turks and
Caicos, the Bahamas, Montserrat, Anguilla, and the British Virgin
Islands, all of which already have been discussed, but also Domi-
nica, St. Lucia, St. Kitts, St. Vincent, Antigua, the Netherlands
Antilles, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. Outside the
Caribbean, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Bahrein are regarded as
major FSJ's in the Asian region, with Nauru, Vanuatu, Taiwan, the
Philippines, Seychelles, the United Arab Emirates, and the Ameri-
can territories of Guam and the Marianas all aspiring to join their
ranks. In Europe, Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Liechtenstein are
regarded as the major FSJ's, with increasing competition from
Austria, Cyprus, Monaco, Malta, Andorra, the Italian territory of
Campione d'Italia and the British isles of Guernsey, Jersey, and
the Isle of Man. Others which provide sufficient financial secrecy
to be included on some FSJ lists are the Netherlands, Canada,
West Germany, France, and Hungary. Indeed, some would put the
City of London at the top of the list. If one speaks broadly of
havens for flight capital of all sorts, however, there is no FSJ which
can compete with the United States. Most of these countries have
as little interest in helping the United States enforce its tax laws as
we have in helping some of them and many others enforce restric-
tions on currency flows or imported goods.
105. The use of FSJ's in the Caribbean to launder dirty money and engage in other
criminal activities is discussed at length in CRIME AND SECRECY, STAFF STUDY, supra note 7;
R. BLUM, supra note 7. Excellent country sketches are provided of the Bahamas, the Cay-
man Islands, Panama, Bermuda, Antigua, Montserrat and Switzerland.
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Some Treasury Department officials express optimism that an
increasing number of governments are coming to the realization
that there is a strong mutual interest in cooperating against tax
evasion. During the last two years, Council of Europe and OECD
member governments have begun drafting a multilateral Conven-
tion on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters which
some anticipate will eventually blossom into an international re-
gime with the same stature and significance which the interna-
tional trade regime, GATT, once claimed. Although the provisions
must inevitably represent the least common denominator at this
early stage, the symbolic significance is regarded as of tremendous
importance, not least in terms of sending a message to the Swiss
that their open door to tax evaders cannot go on forever. On a far
smaller scale, there is talk of reaching a similar agreement among
the members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. Be-
cause such agreements would provide for more extensive exchange
of information than the avoidance-of-double-taxation tax conven-
tions which the United States has already negotiated with some
three dozen countries, they would offer new opportunities for pros-
ecuting drug traffickers and other criminals on tax charges.
Ultimately, the two greatest obstacles to detecting and deter-
ring the laundering of drug money internationally are (1) the exis-
tence of FSJ's, which justify their secrecy laws by claiming that
most of the money which they attract is relatively clean and that
they have no responsibility to participate in the enforcement of
other nations' tax laws; and (2) the sheer magnitude of interna-
tional financial flows (hundreds of billions of dollars each day),
which is such as to obscure even the largest flows of dirty money.
Against these obstacles, all the efforts of law enforcement agencies
at present are but a pittance. On the other hand, U.S. government
efforts to monitor the movement of large amounts of cash, and to
enlist other governments in that effort, have created the first ob-
stacles to the laundering of dirty money. They have provided the
basis for an increasing level of knowledge, information and exper-
tise in this area. And they have been accompanied by a growing
realization that other types of transnational crime, especially those
that have little to do with smuggling, pose potentially grave threats
as well. Not only tax fraud, but also consumer, computer, banking,
securities, and management fraud, as well as a host of other crimes
which take advantage of FSJ's secrecy laws to avoid detection, are
receiving increasing attention from law enforcement and regulatory
agencies around the world. Indeed, one of the most important con-
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sequences of current efforts in detecting drug money laundering is
the impetus which those efforts provide to law enforcement efforts
in these other areas.
VIII. MULTILATERAL APPROACHES
A recurrent argument made by the FSJ's is that even if they
turn away dirty money, it will only go elsewhere. The strength of
this argument is undeniable, although there are limits to it. Cer-
tain FSJ's are particularly attractive to money launderers for any
variety of reasons, including proximity to the United States or
Latin America, ease and frequency of flights to the haven, reliabil-
ity of financial institutions, and sophistication of communications
facilities. Panama, the Caymans, and the Bahamas fit most of
these descriptions. Many other FSJ's are less reliable in terms of
handling large amounts of cash, or inconvenient to get to, or pose
some other problems. Forcing traffickers to rely on less convenient
havens would create greater costs and risks for them, and make
them more vulnerable. A second limit to the argument's merits is
that as the number of FSJ's cooperating against drug money laun-
dering increases, so does the pressure on those which have yet to
cooperate. At the same time, there is no denying the force of the
FSJ's argument, or the compelling need for a multilateral approach
to the problem. To date, much of the impetus for such an ap-
proach has been left up to the United States, although some gov-
ernments are beginning to show increased interest. In a number of
cases, the primary source of that interest is the realization that
helping to trace the paper trail of dirty money may lead to forfei-
ture of drug traffickers' assets into their national treasuries.
Over the past few years, the multilateral approach has been
pursued via several avenues. One, which remains fairly dormant, is
the consideration given to negotiating a multilateral MLAT. Mem-
bers of the European Economic Community (EEC) signed such a
treaty in 1959, and the African states have circulated a draft of
model arrangements.1 06 The idea reportedly was broached at one
time in the Organization of American States (OAS), but no action
was taken. For a number of reasons, the United States has thus far
106. European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, EUROPEAN
TREATY SERIES No. 30; Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters, EUROPEAN TRETY SERIES No. 99. The African draft can be found
at 23 I.L.M. 103 (1984).
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preferred to pursue the bilateral approach. First, a bilateral treaty
almost always goes further than a multilateral one, which often
must be watered down to reflect the lowest common denominator
of agreement. Second, the bilateral approach permits a government
to choose its treaty partners, and avoids the problem of being
obliged to provide information to an unfriendly or untrustworthy
government. Third, many of the problems involved in reconciling
diverse legal systems, such as the common law systems of the
United States and the British Commonwealth with the civil law
systems dominant in Europe and other continents, are only now
being worked out.0° In the American view, the time is far from
ripe to attempt a multilateral MLAT.
Regional MLATs, however, are another matter. As the United
States initially hoped, the Cayman agreement and treaty have pro-
vided a model for other negotiations, especially with the many
FSJ's that are members of the British Commonwealth. The British
government, which originally demanded that any initiatives or
pressures for such arrangements come from the United States, has
proven increasingly forthcoming. The United States also has en-
couraged the International Criminal Police Organization, known as
INTERPOL, to take the lead in pursuing multilateral approaches
to the money laundering problem. That organization's sensitivity
to the issue emerged in the early 1980s when various criminal in-
vestigations around the world pointed up the need for better coor-
dination in tracing dirty money. One response, coordinated by the
U.S. National Central Bureau of INTERPOL, was the creation of a
working group to address the problem in the Caribbean. With par-
ticipation by the United States, Canada, St. Lucia, Barbados,
Montserrat, Anguilla, and the Turks and Caicos, the group held its
third meeting in Anguilla in April 1985 and drafted model legisla-
tion on identifying, tracing and seizing criminal assets.0 s The
draft, which had been designed largely by the American delegation
with the assistance of OIA, was drawn from foreign and American
107. See Nadelmann, supra note 27 (discussion of how U.S. MLAT negotiators have
sought to resolve such differences).
108. The initial meeting was held in Curacao in May 1983, and attended by the United
States, Canada, Argentina, Venezuela, the Cayman Islands, and the Netherlands Antilles.
The second meeting was held in St. Lucia in August 1984, and attended by the same partici-
pants as the Anguilla meeting with the exception that Venezuela attended and Montserrat
did not. The latter two meetings were also attended by a representative from the Customs
Cooperation Council. A fourth meeting, held in the Bahamas in April 1996, was devoted to
more operational aspects of dealing with money laundering, such as the installation of new
telecommunications equipment to enhance inter-island law enforcement cooperation.
[Vol. 18:1
UNLAUNDERING DIRTY MONEY
legislation, the MLATs, and the Cayman agreement and its imple-
menting legislation. It has since been circulated worldwide to the
governments of all INTERPOL members, a number of which have
enacted legislation modeled on its provisions.
Other regional INTERPOL groups are watching the actions
that the Caribbean countries have taken in this area to determine
whether they should follow suit. In late 1985, American delegates
offered similar model legislation at a meeting of the East Asia/Pa-
cific group, which includes a number of the up-and-coming FSJ's.
In Europe, the INTERPOL Secretariat established a financial as-
sets group (FOPAC) following the General Assembly meeting in
Cannes in 1983. Staffed by two Americans, it has focused its efforts
on sensitizing law enforcement agencies in Europe and elsewhere
to the need for and benefits of financial flow investigations, and to
informing them of the techniques which have been developed. 0 9
FOPAC's efforts, materials and intelligence have helped strengthen
the hand of law enforcement agencies seeking greater support in
this area from their governments. The INTERPOL division also
has cooperated with the Customs Cooperation Council (CCC),
sought greater participation from the United Nations Fund for
Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) and generally offered coordination
and information exchange in international financial investigations.
At least in Europe, INTERPOL has been primarily responsible for
what action has been taken on the declarations by the Council of
Europe's drug enforcement group, known as the Pompidou Group,
with respect to money laundering.
INTERPOL's involvement in this area, particularly insofar as
it includes encouraging legislation and treaties, has been comple-
mented by the role of the United Nations. Following a meeting in
1980 by the U.N. Division of Narcotic Drugs to discuss this is-
sue, 110 a multinational "Expert Group on the Forfeiture of the Pro-
ceeds of Drug Crimes" was created. At two meetings in Vienna in
late 1983 and 1984, the group reviewed the efforts which had been
taken around the world to date, and encouraged the enactment of
legislation and the negotiation of bilateral, regional and interna-
tional agreements to help identify, trace, seize, freeze and forfeit
109. Among FOPAC's efforts has been the compilation of a Financial Assets Encyclo-
paedia which summarizes the currency control and asset forfeiture laws of 58 member
countries.
110. See U.N. REPORT ON THE MEETING ON FINANCIAL AssETs AND TRANSACTIONS RE-
LATED TO ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFIC, U.N. Doc. E/CN.7/657/Add.2 (October 22, 1980).
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proceeds of drug trafficking. 1 ' The experts agreed that all efforts
were complementary in this area, and that all avenues should be
pursued. Among their specific recommendations was that the prin-
cipal international drug control treaty, the 1961 Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs (and 1972 Protocol) be either amended or sup-
plemented by an additional convention which would specifically
address the issues of money laundering and asset forfeiture. The
benefits of such an addition to international legislation were per-
ceived as threefold: it would provide a multilateral framework for
nations negotiating bilateral agreements; it would provide guidance
to governments interested in enacting legislation in this area; and
it would increase the pressure on non-conforming governments to
follow step. The report of the experts' second meeting included
their suggestions for such a convention.
In reviewing other efforts being undertaken, the Expert Group
noted the work of INTERPOL and the negotiation of MLATs and
the Cayman agreement by the United States. Among the regional
efforts noted were those of the Caribbean states, as well as those of
the Pompidou Group and similar efforts by members of the Associ-
ation of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The CCC's efforts in
expanding mutual administrative assistance in customs matters
were also mentioned, both in regard to a joint CCC-INTERPOL
Mediterranean conference held in Lisbon in mid-1984, and in re-
gard to the Nairobi Convention on assistance in customs mat-
ters." 2 Also noted was the work of the Commonwealth Secretariat,
including the Legal Division's drafting of model legislation and a
Commonwealth MLAT, and its Commercial Crime Unit's develop-
ment of intelligence on dirty money flows. Finally, the group noted
the existence of another U.S. "expert group," on international co-
operation to combat international tax evasion and avoidance,
which it was hoped would contribute additional approaches to
tackling the problem.
Since late 1984, efforts have been underway to draft a new
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances. Early drafts have focused on improving interna-
111. See U.N. Doc. DNDIWP.1983/23 (October 31, 1983); U.N. Doc. MNAR/1984/13
(November 2, 1984).
112. The Nairobi Convention is formally known as the International Convention on
Mutual Administrative Assistance for the Prevention, Investigation and Repression of Cus-
toms Offenses. The relevant provision is Annex X, which covers illicit drug traffic and re-
lated financial operations. As of 1983, there were 13 parties to the Convention.
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tional cooperation in the law enforcement aspects of drug control,
including extradition, mutual legal assistance, financial investiga-
tions, and asset forfeiture. 13 The INTERPOL model legislation,
the Expert Group's recommendations, and the individual legisla-
tion of a variety of governments all have provided guidance in
drafting the provisions on money laundering. The draft will be dis-
cussed and refined at the annual meeting of the U.N. Commission
on Narcotic Drugs in February 1987 and at a U.N. International
Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking in June 1987,
both to be held in Vienna. If no significant obstacles arise, the new
drug convention will probably be signed in 1988, after which it
must be ratified by individual governments before it takes effect.
IX. GOVERNMENT COMPETITION FOR BLACK MARKET DOLLARS
A complementary dimension to the international money laun-
dering problem involves the efforts of non-FSJ governments to
keep money from fleeing their countries. Particularly in Latin
America, many governments appear to have realized the relative
futility of currency control regulations and have adopted other
techniques, some of which benefit money launderers. These basi-
cally involve creating incentives for drug traffickers and others in-
volved in the underground economy to keep their money in the
country's banks and to bring money earned abroad into the
country.
The Colombian government, even as it cracks down on drug
trafficking and increases its asset forfeiture powers, has taken mea-
sures to minimize the loss of drug money from the economy. In
Peru, the government has eliminated the requirement to register
one's name when purchasing certificates of deposit. This in effect
eases the money laundering process since bearer CDs function like
cash and are almost as difficult to trace.114 There is also substantial
curiosity among Americans interested in this area as to what role
113. See U.N. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON IMPLEMENTATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS ON THE CONTROL OF NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHO-
TROPIC SUBSTANCES, U.N. Doc. E/CN.7/1987/2 (June 17, 1986).
114. See 11 The Andean Report (April 1985) at 41-43 (efforts of the Peruvian and Co-
lombian governments in this area). The Peruvian government has also found another way to
profit off the drug traffickers' need for currency exchange. Three times a week, the Banco
Continental sends a plane full of soles to Tingo Maria and returns with dollars and bearer
CDs. The basis of this profitable practice of arbitrage is the difference in the soles/dollars
exchange rate between Lima and the coca center, where dollars are more abundant than in
the capital.
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Mexico plays in money laundering. Transporting dollars over the
border may be the easiest way of getting dirty money out of the
country. ' There is insufficient evidence, however, to indicate
whether it is also the most frequent. In Ecuador, major banking
officials are reportedly involved in providing short-term financing
to drug traffickers at exorbitant interest rates. And in Argentina,
there is increasing evidence that the highly developed banking sys-
tem is being used to launder money and transfer it around the
world. It is impossible to estimate what share of this is drug money
as opposed to revenue from other sectors of Latin America's tre-
mendous underground economy. While Argentina's banks have not
developed as a haven for dirty money because of concern over the
country's political and economic instability, its banking system has
nonetheless been utilized to wire and otherwise transfer dirty
money to Europe, Asia and elsewhere.
X. CONCLUSION
As long as drug traffickers and other criminals continue to
profit from their activities, their need to launder dirty money will
persist. Unless the United States drastically curtails the relatively
free flow of money within its borders, most of that laundering will
continue to occur within the United States. Not just banks but
lawyers, travel agents, real estate brokers, retail stores, and other
businesses which deal in relatively large amounts of cash will con-
tinue to be used by criminals to launder their money. Imposing
increasingly onerous regulations requiring them to report large-
scale transactions, including those which do not involve cash, will
be difficult and costly. If those regulations are perceived as too
burdensome, or if the information acquired by the government is
abused by government officials, a resulting backlash may set law
enforcement efforts back substantially-just as the Right to Finan-
cial Privacy Act did a number of years ago.
As for the minority of billions which gets laundered abroad
each year, efforts to stop that activity will continue to run up
against substantial obstacles: borders which are even more porous
going out than coming in; the reluctance of dollar-hungry foreign
banks, businesses, and governments to turn away dollars no matter
how dirty the money may be; and the tremendous international
115. See, e.g., Gerth, Mexico Drug Profits Flowing to U.S., N.Y. Times, June 3, 1986 at
A3, col. 1.
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underground economy, reflecting not only traditional criminal ac-
tivity but capital flight from inflation, instability, high taxes and
duties, and so on. In this sea of black market dollars, drug money
will rarely be readily discernible.
This article has discussed the unilateral, bilateral, and multi-
lateral efforts of the United States with respect to the interna-
tional laundering of drug money. These efforts have essentially
been oriented toward obtaining three things: information, evi-
dence, and the body (i.e., the criminal). Over the past few years,
the United States has made substantial strides in all of these areas.
The negotiation of MLATs, special narcotics cooperation agree-
ments, and tax exchange-of-information agreements has facilitated
the flow of information, particularly in forms admissible in Ameri-
can courts. Unilateral U.S. measures have increased the overall
availability of information, most notably through stepped-up en-
forcement of the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act.
Foreign governments have proven increasingly forthcoming both in
supplying information and evidence as well as taking the initiative
in bank regulation, financial investigations and multilateral activi-
ties. And, although I have not discussed the matter in this article,
the number of governments willing to extradite criminals for
money laundering offenses is gradually increasing. 1 6
It is hoped that these efforts will make it increasingly difficult
for drug traffickers to launder money. As the number of safe
havens dwindle, and the multinational capacities of their pursuers
expand, disposing of drug profits will become a source of both in-
creased trouble and risk. Theoretically, the result will be greater
disincentives to engaging in drug trafficking, increased costs to
traffickers and consumers, better chances of catching, imprisoning
and impoverishing those who do profit from trafficking, and a cor-
responding benefit to the governments which seize those profits.
Despite the infinite variety of money laundering techniques
available to drug traffickers, the above logic is difficult to chal-
lenge. At this relatively early date in multilateral and even unilat-
116. For instance, in 1984 the Betancur Government in Colombia finally agreed to ex-
tradite some of its citizens to the United States to face charges related to drug trafficking.
One of those turned over, Hernan Botero, was from a powerful and wealthy family and had
been charged only with money laundering violations, not drug trafficking per se. The deci-
sion to treat Botero the same as those involved directly in drug trafficking reportedly cre-
ated a major stir in Colombian financial circles. See Robbins & Ames, Money Laundering,
Bus. Wk., Mar. 18, 1985, at 74, 79 (cover story).
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eral efforts to deal with money laundering, law enforcement agen-
cies can only improve in their efforts. Simply creating an
international exception to financial secrecy laws in narcotics cases
will go a long way toward increasing the insecurity and vulnerabil-
ity of large-scale drug trafficking organizations. The same is true of
asset forefeiture legislation around the world, which can improve
foreign governments' incentives to cooperate in drug money laun-
dering cases.
It is important to realize that the United States has used a
variety of techniques to make progress in its efforts against money
laundering. With foreign countries, carrots and sticks, as well as
powers of suggestion, have all been used. The sticks, in the form of
subpoenas, and public criticism by the government, Congress and
the media, often have proven particularly effective. The carrots, in
the form of the CBI and other incentives, also have had some posi-
tive effect, but perhaps not as much as hoped. The suggestions
that cooperation might be in their own best interests, coming as
they do with the political suasion of the United States, have cer-
tainly not hurt, although their impact has been questionable.
Given the inevitably incremental nature of progress in this area,
there is little choice but to continue pursuing each of these
approaches.
A fairly safe assumption with which to conclude is that five
years from now substantial progress will have been made in the
international effort against transnational crime, and against inter-
national drug money laundering in particular. The number of
MLATs to which the United States is a party will have doubled or
tripled. Tax exchange-of-information agreements will also have
proliferated. The efforts of the United States, INTERPOL, and
others to encourage legislation dealing with identifying, tracing,
freezing, seizing, and forfeiting drug-derived revenues will have
met with substantial success. A new Single Convention with provi-
sions addressing this issue will have been adopted and approved by
dozens of countries. As a result of all this, drug traffickers trying to
launder their funds will be faced with far greater challenges than
they are today.
Domestically, there are also reasons for optimism. The Bank
Secrecy Act and other laws aimed at tracing and seizing drug-re-
lated assets have been strengthened recently and will no doubt be
further so. The same is true of compliance with those laws. So long
as these laws and their enforcement are able to avoid occasioning a
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severe backlash, the drug trafficker's task of laundering his money
will become increasingly hazardous.
The biggest unknown concerns the broader context which I
have sought to address. On the one hand, increasing concern
worldwide with all other forms of transnational economic crime
will no doubt redound to the benefit of the government detective
trying to trace the trafficker's paper trail. On the other hand, the
desparate economic condition of much of Latin America, the Car-
ibbean, and other regions will continue to affect their commitment
to international law enforcement and their willingness to turn
away dirty money. Unless they are able to find alternative sources
of revenue, they will be hard pressed to play by the same rules as
the financially and economically sophisticated nations. That, in the
final analysis, represents perhaps the greatest challenge to success
in this enterprise.
